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HUMAN RIGHTS AND POST-IMPERIALISM:
ARGUING FOR A DELIBERATIVE
LEGITIMATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Amy Bartholomew*

A new architecture of fights, based on a new foundation
and with a new justification, is called for.'
INTRODUCTION:
MULTICULTURALISM, GLOBALIZATION, POST-METAPHYSICS
AND THE PROBLEM OF LEGITIMATING HUMAN RIGHTS

The question of how to justify and legitimate human fights has
taken center stage in the current conjuncture of multiculturalism and globalization, on the one hand, and the post metaphysical turn, on the other hand.
Susan Mendus, for example, has argued that we would do well to resist
questions of justification in favor of a turn to "the political" itself. She
premises this suggestion on the claim that the problem we currently face is

not a weakening or contested political commitment to human fights, since it
is just as the "political commitment to human fights has grown, [that] philosophical commitment has waned."' 2 On the strength of this diagnosis she
encourages approaching fights from the vantage point of political practice,
rather than political theory, and suggests that by adopting a position of pessimism we can best articulate what we stand to lose in political practice "if
we renounce the language of human rights."3 This strategy may then provide a pragmatic defense of human fights aimed at addressing philosophical

doubts while avoiding what she apparently considers to be a necessarily
foundationalist reliance on justification. I agree with positions like
Mendus's that argue a turn to "the political" is necessary. Yet I question
the diagnosis and guiding assumption that underlies such positions that it is
Amy Bartholomew is Associate Professor and Supervisor of Graduate Studies
in the Department of Law, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada. Her current work
focuses on the implications of deliberative democratic theory for questions of
human rights, multiculturalism and the justice of borders. Thanks to Andrew Arato,
A. Belden Fields, Leo Panitch, Peter Swan, Kalapi Roy, and Neil Stammers for
reading and commenting on earlier drafts of this manuscript.
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a tattered philosophical commitment to rights that must be addressed by a
turn to political practice, because political commitment to human rights has
"grown." I also question the pragmatic solution that approaches like hers
endorse and the apparent interpretation of justification as always-already
infected by a now discredited foundationalism.
Whether the claim that the political commitment to human rights
has grown is premised on the emergence of a wide variety of social movements and non-governmental organizations pressing for human rights, the
flourishing of international and regional human rights declarations, and the
expansion of human rights discourses, as it is in Mendus's case, or whether
it is associated with the spread of modernity as it is for others, 4 it threatens
to neglect some problems currently besetting human rights broadly construed to include international, regional and constitutional rights by oversimplifying the character of existing political commitments to them. While
it seems true that human rights have become the lingua franca of late modernity, it is because political commitments to them have been challenged
in a variety of ways by political elites, social movements and processes
connected with multiculturalism and globalization, as well as by the post
metaphysical turn in philosophy, that issues of their justification and legitimation are currently pressing.
Multicultural claims and movements raise questions for and in the
constitutional regimes of established liberal democracies and elsewhere by
bringing different cultures into close contact while also maintaining that
equal respect requires the recognition and protection of cultural differences. 5 In their milder forms, such movements may challenge the adequacy
of universalistic conceptions of citizenship rights for meeting the needs of
cultural minorities. More radical claims may be directed at the very nature
6
and interpretation of rights and their apparently liberal underpinnings.
Similarly, claims of cultural differences at the global level sometimes raise
challenges to the content and roots of existing articulations of international
See Seyla Benhabib, Cultural Complexity, Moral Interdependence, and the
Global DialogicalCommunity, in WOMEN, CULTURE, AND DEVELOPMENT 235-255
4

(Martha C. Nussbaum and Jonathan Glover eds., 1995).
5

See

FRED DALLMAYR, BEYOND ORIENTALISM: EssSAYS ON CROSS-CULTURAL

ENCOUNTER

(1996).

A LIBERAL THEORY OF
MINORITY RIGHTS (1995); Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION, 25 (Amy Gutmann
ed., 1994); Jirgen Habermas, Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State, in MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION
105 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994 Struggles for Recognition).
6
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human rights, or, more radically, to their legitimacy. Thus, one of the more
intractable debates has been whether human rights-heirs of the Enlightenment project-are truly universal, or rather, whether they represent merely
Western sentiments and commitments. And, not just philosophers and political and social theorists express these concerns; they are also expressed in
social movements, in their struggles and strategies, and by political elites.
Processes of globalization are complex, still obscure and apparently
contradictory. On their cultural, social and political side they may involve
the nascent emergence of global public spheres and global civil society 7 as
well as global interpenetration bringing different cultural groupings and societies into closer proximity raising the question of "whose" norms and
"which" understandings shall govern global relations and under what conditions. These processes of globalization are such that they may bring with
them possibilities for new political projects, transnational solidarities and
transformative forms of cosmopolitanism. 8 As well, however, globalization
has brought breathtaking increases in global inequality and expanded possibilities for both global and local injustices and forms of domination. Increasingly, some perceptive critics view the new situation as involving
important democratic deficits and a new form of imperialism view the new
situation. 9 Boaventura de Sousa Santos suggests, for example, "[e]ven if it
is true that the intensification of cross-boundary encounters and interdependency have created new terrains hospitable to tolerance, ecumenicism,
world solidarity and cosmopolitanism, it is no less true that, side by side,
new forms of intolerance, chauvinism and imperialism have likewise
developed." 10

7 See, e.g., JURGEN HABERMAS, Kant's Idea of PerpetualPeace, with the Benefit
of Two Hundred Years Hindsight, in PERPETUAL PEACE: ESSAYS ON KANT'S COSMOPOLITAN IDEAL 113-154 (James Bohman & Mathias Lutz-Bachmann eds.,
1997); JAMES BOHMAN, The Public Spheres of the World Citizen, in PERPETUAL
PEACE: ESSAYS ON KANT'S COSMOPOLITAN IDEAL 179-200 (James Bohman & Mathias Lutz-Bachmann eds., 1997).
8 See COSMOPOLITICS: THINKING AND FEELING BEYOND THE NATION (Pheng
Cheah & Bruce Robbins

eds.,

1998), for discussions of different forms of

cosmopolitanism.

9

For critics of the new imperialism see Leo V. Panitch, The New Imperial State,

2 NEW LEFT REV. 5 (2000); SANTOS, supra note 1; Ulrich Beck, The Cosmopolitan
Perspective: Sociology of the Second Age of Modernity, 51 BRIT. J. OF Soc. 79

(2000);
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In this context, from one point of view, the discourses of human
rights seem increasingly pertinent, as human rights movements take the
stage demanding that nation-states, capital, regional blocs and international
and local actors live up to human rights norms. Yet it is painfully clear that
rights can be wielded in multiple and contradictory ways, as both
emancipatory and regulatory forces." Emphasizing the regulatory dimensions in an important contribution to thinking about the implications of the
rise of cosmopolitan law, Ulrich Beck suggests that it is precisely insofar as
demands for human rights are legitimate that we may neglect to notice
"how neatly they can be dovetailed with old fashioned aims of imperialist
world politics. ' ' 12 Human rights imperialism may have many faces-military, cultural and political to name the most obvious-but it is the cultural
face of human rights, which has perhaps been most significantly contested
recently. The processes of globalization have been identified as involving
the imposition of a "globalized Western localism" in the form of the imposition of dominant conceptions of human rights on societies, cultures or
actors that reject them, who have not been equal participants in the development and interpretation of human rights norms, 13 or who wish to renegotiate
the boundaries, interpretation and content of existing conceptions of human
rights and develop new ones. All of this should caution us against "triumphalist" conclusions about the emergence of cosmopolitan law and the
evasions that the claim that commitment to human rights has grown may
engender.
1
SANTOS, supra note 1. See also Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a Multicultural Conception of Human Rights, 18 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 1
(1997); Neil Stammers, Social Movements and the Social Construction of Human
Rights, 12 HuM. RTS. Q. 980 (1999); Richard A. Falk, False Universalism and the
Geopoliticsof Exclusion: The Case of Islam, 18 THIRD WORLD Q. 7 (1997) [hereinafter False Universalism]; RICHARD A. FALK, ROBERT C. JOHANSEN, & SAMUEL S.
KIM, Global Constitutionalism and World Order, in THE CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD PEACE (Richard A. Falk, Robert C. Johansen, & Samuel S.

Kim eds., 1993);

ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE NATION-STATE AND VIOLENCE: VOLUME

(1985); Amy
Bartholomew and Alan Hunt, What's Wrong With Rights?, 9 J. LAW & INEQUALITY 1 (1990).
12 Beck, supra note 9, at 86.
13 SANTOS, supra note 1, at 339. "It is a common complaint in the non-Western
world that 'international' human rights instruments [like the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights] have been shaped largely by the values and aspirations of Western liberal societies and they have not yet adequately incorporated non-Western
views." Daniel A. Bell, Which Rights are Universal? 27 POL. THEORY 849, 849
Two OF A CONTEMPORARY CRITIQUE OF HISTORICAL MATERIALISM

(1999).
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Under these conditions of a variety of challenges to human rights, a
defensive and dogmatic "pro human rights" position cannot be sustained for
such a position threatens to treat unjustly those who feel excluded and misrecognized-to say nothing of feelings of more abject violation-precisely
by various aspects of current human rights regimes. Yet, we should not
give up the ground of human rights as a potentially emancipatory project.
This seems especially important now when the processes of economic
globalization bring with them an almost unimaginable expansion in the possibilities for oppression and exploitation while cultural globalization threatens a neoimperial homogenization and military hegemony threatens violent
destruction. Itis in this context that I think we should seek to deepen political and social commitments to human rights globally, but this may require
opening the door to a new legitimation of them. Under these conditions,
legitimation must countenance the resistance to, and the demands for, the
reexamination and possibly the reinterpretation of human rights norms,
rather than relying on a dogmatic defense of existing rights against all challengers. This may allow address of one aspect of the problem of the
'dovetailing' between human rights and imperialist politics-the aspect of
cultural imposition.
If a problem currently besetting human rights is that they are in fact
politically contested, then a turn to "the political" like Mendus's is incomplete. The presence of a variety of doubts about and contests over rights is
expressed in everyday political practices, not just by philosophers and political theorists of an anti-foundational stripe. De Sousa Santos maintains that
the "record of violations of human rights across the world system in the
postwar period is a cruel comment on the human rights dominant discourse
and a flat denial of the practical validity of international declarations on
normative consensus." 14 I am unconvinced that such violations constitute
flat denials of validity-practical or otherwise. But there is a range of political challenges to international, regional and domestic human rights regimes
that can only effectively be met through renewed attention to enhancing
their social and political legitimacy, a problem that strategies like Mendus's
of identifying what we stand to lose if we renounce rights is insufficient to
address. While I agree that we should seek to avoid foundationalist versions of justification, a monological approach is inadequate under these
circumstances.
The role attributed to the justification and legitimation of human
rights should thus be clarified. If it is the case that commitments to, and
interpretations of, human rights face a variety of political challenges, then a
turn to "the political" requires a turn to political and social legitimation.
14

SANTOS,

supra note 1, at 332.
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Many commentators recognize that the gap between the "theory and practice" of rights hinders their effectiveness. For example, Abdullahi AnNa'im says, "the process through which the current international human
rights standards were formulated and adopted did not address issues of cultural legitimacy in relation to most of the cultural traditions of the world."' 5
James Nickel suggests, "itis very doubtful whether there is sufficient agreement worldwide to support anything like the full range of rights declared in
contemporary manifestos."' 16 Similarly, Jurgen Habermas maintains,
"[h]uman rights provide the sole recognized basis of legitimation for the
politics of the international community; nearly every state has by now accepted, at least on paper, the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights.
Nevertheless, the general validity, content and ranking of human rights are
17
as contested as ever."'
We should resist foundationalist or metaphysical conceptions of
justification for they are both unconvincing after the post metaphysical turn
and, under these conditions of contestation, they are counterproductive. The
post metaphysical turn rejects the metaphysical assumptions so deeply embedded in much rights discourse, maintaining that there are no ultimate
foundations on which we could hope to ground an objective morality, or a
set of incontestable, inalienable human rights. 18 Thus, we cannot, as Nickel
15

Abdullahi An-Na'im, Problems of Universal Cultural Legitimacy for Human

Rights, in

HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA:

CROSS-CULTURAL

PERSPECTIVES

331, 333

(Abdullahi An-Na'im & Francis M. Deng eds., 1990).
16

JAMES NICKEL, MAKING SENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHICAL REFLEC-

39 (1987).
Jurgen Habermas, Remarks on Legitimation through Human Rights, 24 PHIL. &
SOC. CRITICISM 157, 162 (1998).
18 Seyla Benhabib indicates the outlines of the "metaphysical illusions of the Enlightenment" as including "the illusions of a self-transparent and self-grounding
reason, the illusion of a disembedded and disembodied subject, and the illusion of
having found an Archimedean standpoint, situated beyond historical and cultural
contingency". These illusions, she maintains, have "long ceased to convince." A
postmetaphysical version of "interactive universalism", on the other hand, involves
"the universal pragmatic reformulation of the basis of the validity of truth claims in
terms of a discourse theory of justification; the vision of an embodied and embedded human self whose identity is constituted narratively, and the reformulation of
the moral point of view as the contingent achievement of an interactive form of
rationality rather than as the timeless standpoint of a legislative reason. Taken
together, these premises form a broad conception of reason, self, and society."
TIONS ON THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

17

SEYLA BENHABIB, SITUATING THE SELF: GENDER, COMMUNITY AND POSTMODERNISM IN CONTEMPORARY ETHICS

4, 6 (1992).
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suggests, "discount disagreement" on human rights. 19 Furthermore, adherence to a foundationalist justification is positively counter-productive for
addressing the most pressing problems of human rights in late modernity
because it fails seriously to address the variety and force of the claims that
are launched against human rights in political struggles lapsing instead into
"moral imperialism," 20 a position that can be expected to foment further
objections and resistances to human rights.
Yet, we require justifications and legitimations for human rights
for, as Michael Freeman has put it, "rights without reasons are vulnerable to
denial and abuse."121 Arguments like Mendus's that provide a reasoned,
pragmatic defense of human rights by specifying the political functions they
fulfill are an important part of this process despite the fact that she denies
that her reason-giving takes the form of a justification. But justification
need not be "foundationalist" in the sense of relying on ultimate truths
about human nature that are treated as self-evident or above rational contestation.22 As Freeman further recognizes, "[t]o avoid the charge of moral
imperialism, human rights advocates must vindicate the philosophical correctness of their position. '23 It is the "vindication" of human rights that
must be undertaken in an effort to enhance their political and social legitimacy, and this, I will suggest, may best be approached deliberatively, since
legitimacy, after the post metaphysical turn, depends on rational acceptability. On the Habermasian version of the turn, for which I will argue, the loss
of ultimate foundations does not issue in the rejection of reason, of conceptions of moral rightness or of universalism. Rather, these aspects of rights
supra note 16, at 82.
Michael Freeman, The PhilosophicalFoundations of Human Rights, 16 HUM.
RTS. Q. 491, 495 (1994).
21
Id. at 493.
22 As authors like Habermas, Rainer Forst and Amy Gutmann show. See JURGEN
19

NICKEL,

20

HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (1996) [hereinafter, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS];

Jurgen Habermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics,

(Ciaran, Cronin, trans., 1993) [hereinafter Justification and Application]; Jurgen
Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays, (William Mark
Hohengarten, trans. 1992); Morality and Ethical Life: Does Hegel's Critique of
Kant Apply to Discourse Ethics? 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 38 (1989) [hereinafter, MoRALITY AND ETHICAL LIFE]; RAINER FORST, Justice, Reason and Critique: Basic
Concepts in Critical Theory, in HANDBOOK OF CRITICAL THEORY 138-162 (David
Rasmussen ed., 1996); Amy Gutmann, Democracy, Philosophy and Justification,
in

DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL

340-347 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996).
23 Freeman, supra note 20, at 495.
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discourse are recast in intersubjective, discursive and procedural terms,
leaving rights bereft of ultimate guarantees, yet not rendered so contingent
that "all that is solid melts into air."
The confluence, then, of multiculturalism, globalization and postmetaphysical thinking has the following consequences. First, while natural
rights language continues to be employed in political and social struggles,
natural rights theory is no longer convincing to many. Second, under conditions of globalization and multiculturalism we seem to require the resources of rights in order to challenge the new and multiplying forms of
domination both to protect and to limit multicultural claims and to respond
to processes of globalization. But, third, these transformations signal the
necessity for opening human rights up to reinventions and reinterpretations
in order to respond to new challenges and, crucially, to legitimate human
rights as (possibly) genuinely universal. Conceived by and put into place
largely through the ministrations of "the West," it is time that human rights
receive the political and social legitimation that only intra- and cross-cultural dialogues can provide in order, as de Sousa Santos has so compelling
put it, to begin to develop a "post-imperial" conception, legitimation and
hopefully practice, of human rights.
I will argue that a turn to the deliberative proceduralism that lies at
the heart of Habermasian Critical Theory, bolstered by Santos's suggestion
that the most pressing issue of our time "consists in transforming the conceptualization and practice of human rights from a globalized localism into
a cosmopolitan project," 24 holds the promise of developing such a postimperial approach to human rights aimed at justly developing the political
and social legitimacy necessary (but not necessarily sufficient) for their just
implementation and cross- and intra-cultural acceptance. Globalization,
multiculturalism and postmetaphysical thinking require that we legitimate
human rights standards through radically open, potentially transformative
dialogues and justificatory discourses, dependent on political projects and
more and less contestatory social movements which press for their reinvention and relegitimation. I will argue that Habermas' s conception of deliberative proceduralism is well-suited to this task.
In the first section of this article I consider the interpretive and
agonal approaches that, with the postmetaphysical turn, vie for the acceptance that procedural approaches like Habermas's also seek, providing alternative versions of the relationship between "the political" and human rights.
Interpretive approaches thematize the importance of everyday political, societal and cultural practices that may congeal into "shared understandings"
establishing the legitimacy of human rights or they thematize a pragmatic
24

SANTOS, supra note 1, at 339.
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"persuasive" strategy for extending the recognition of rights. Agonal approaches emphasize the importance of unbounded agonistic or contestatory
politics, in particular to the expression of difference. In the second section I
will argue that Habermasian approaches, on the other hand, are premised on
a discursive theory of democratic legitimacy highlighting the importance of

a procedurally governed, deliberative legitimation of human rights. I maintain that we require attention to both the often contestatory politics of rights
as is sometimes illuminated in interpretive and especially in agonal accounts and to their deliberative legitimation. Attention to the necessary relationship between the political struggles around rights and the conditions
for their just redefinition and legitimation may be accommodated by developing a discourse-theoretic approach to rights on the basis of Habermas's
procedural theory of deliberative democratic legitimacy.
I.

INTERPRETIVISM AND AGONISM

From Rawls to Rorty, Walzer to Warnke, the project of philosophically justifying rights seems to have given way to one of "articulating"
rights, 25 that is, articulating the "deeper understandings" shared by a community or the world, 26 articulating the "overlapping consensus," 27 or articulating "sad and sentimental stories" that are said to provide the only
available basis for the recognition of rights and the extension of "our human
rights culture. '28 The appeal of an interpretive approach under conditions
of postmetaphysics, multiculturalism and globalization seems obvious. It
avoids foundationalism and in the hands of authors like Michael Walzer and
Georgia Warnke, at least, it seeks to respect pluralism and difference. In
Walzer' s case this is sought by relying on an empirical version of universalism coupled with a limited cultural relativism, while for Warnke it is sought
by appealing to forms of pluralistic, hermeneutic conversation. 29 But some

of the problems that an interpretive approach faces are also clear. I will
For the idea that these approaches "articulate" rather than justify rights see
Mendus, supra note 2, at 15. See also SHANE O'NEILL, IMPARTIALITY IN CONTEXT:
25

GROUNDING JUSTICE IN A PLURALIST WORLD 7 (1997).
26 MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983) [hereinafter, SPHERES OF JUSTICE].

See also MICHAEL

WALZER, THICK AND THIN: MORAL ARGUMENT AT HOME

AND ABROAD (1994) [hereinafter, THICK AND THIN].
27 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).

Richard Rorty, Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality, in ON HUMAN
RIGHTS: THE OXFORD AMNESTY LECTURES 111-134 (Stephen Shute & Susan Hurley eds., 1993).
29 GEORGIA WARNKE, JUSTICE AND INTERPRETATION 157 (1993).
28
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focus on Walzer's and Rorty's positions in order to clarify what I take to be
the nature of these problems.
Michael Walzer's interpretive approach to matters of justice and
human rights seeks to resist the "philosophical impulse" to clarify the moral
point of view of impartiality.3 0 According to Walzer, there is no such singular thing, no "moral equivalent of Esperanto,"3 1 no Archimedean point
dissociated from context and history capable of providing a ground zero or
neutral point of view. He thus rejects proceduralism for this one overarching reason; that what is considered the procedural minimum by authors as
diverse as Rawls, Hampshire and Habermas actually constitutes quite a substantive basis, reflecting a particular way of life. 32 In place of such
proceduralism, Walzer seeks to interpret and articulate what "people like us
would choose," "situated as we are." This, then, requires attention to shared
understandings of social goods and our relations to them and this, in turn,
requires attention to our "deeper understandings" of social goods-those
"roughly knowable standards" that are "not necessarily mirrored in the everyday practice of domination and monopoly." With the emphasis on interpreting cultural understandings, Walzer suggests that justice requires
respect for the specific creations of particular societies, 33 thus respecting the
"universalism of 'self-determination.' 34
Walzer does not deny that there may be universal moral principles
like human rights. For Walzer, moral principles may be found in the
"thick" social understandings of a particular community where they express
societal shared understandings 3 5 and where they are reiterated across communities to form "thin," morally universal, but empirical or conventional,
and "reiteratively particularist" commitments.3 6 By "reiteratively particularist" Walzer means that such universal commitments are not foundational
in character. Rather, they designate reiterated features of thick particular
moralities 37 expressing common responses to societal problems. Human
rights are one type of such reiterated commitments providing the conventional ground rules for "peaceful coexistence" between societies and culsupra note 26.
supra note 26, at 9.

30

SPHERES OF JUSTICE,

31

THICK AND THIN,

32

RAwLS,

A

THEORY OF JUSTICE

(1971);

STUART HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE IS CON-

(2000); Morality and Ethical Life, supra note 22; THICK
note 26, at 12.
33 SPHERES OF JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 18, 10, n.3, 26, 314.
34 THICK AND THIN, supra note 26, at x.
FLICT

35

SPHERES OF JUSTICE,

36

THICK AND THIN,

37

Id. at 10.

supra note 26.

supra note 26, at 7.

AND THIN,

supra
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tures.38 Such thin, but widespread, minimum morality is, according to
Walzer, important for expressing mutual recognition 9 and providing
grounds for both solidarity and criticism. While seeking to be pluralistic by
respecting the moral equality of different peoples, however, I believe that
Walzer's approach to issues of justice and rights exemplify some weaknesses of postmetaphysical approaches of the interpretive or hermeneutic
40

sort.

By expressly rejecting proceduralism 4 interpretive approaches like
Walzer's cannot deal adequately with multiculturalism or globalization.
While immanent interpretation coupled with a culturally relativist stand
may appear to accommodate multicultural concerns by respecting cultural
plurality, in fact it is hard-pressed to deal with the increasingly relevant
phenomenon of multicultural, multinational states like Canada and the U.S.
In such cases, where a variety of conflicting "shared understandings" are
likely to meet and clash, what are the principles of justice to be recognized
and how are they to be chosen? This remains unclear despite Walzer's
recent attention to modes of toleration. 42 The underlying problem here, as
in his earlier work, remains the interpretive approach that he employs to
discern appropriate modes of toleration under various conditions. As illuminating as his thick descriptions are, his normative analysis remains a subjective, rather than an intersubjective, interpretation of purportedly extant
practices and understandings. In this work, as in earlier ones, we find no
non-interpretive way of judging between his account and other possible accounts for he offers, and given his approach can offer, no criteria for judg38

MICHAEL WALZER, ON TOLERATION

39

THICK AND

40

(1997).

THIN, supra note 26, at 17.
One pitfall that I do not think Walzer falls into, but others do, is conventional-

ism or conservatism. Benhabib's interpretation of Walzer's position as a "normative hermeneutic" which seeks not just to read, but rather to revise, common
cultural understandings with "better" and more progressive ones and Warnke's that
his are "partisan interpretations" are correct, I think. See BENHABIB, supra note 18,

at 79-80; WARNKE, supra note 29, at 37. By appealing to a society's "ideals" and
interpreting them in this normative way, Walzer seeks to avoid mere conventionalism. This is made especially clear in his response to critics. See THICK AND THIN,
supra note 26, at 41-61.
41 THICK AND THIN, supra note 26, at 12. See also Walzer, supra note 38, at 1-7;
SPHERES OF JUSTICE, supra note 26; WALZER, A Critique of PhilosophicalConversation, in HERMENEUTICS AND CRITICAL THEORY IN ETHICS AND POLITICS 182-195
(Michael Kelly ed. 1990) [hereinafter, A Critique of Philosophical Conversation].
WALZER, supra note 38.

42
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ment. 43 Furthermore, if there can be no limits to particular cultural
practices other than those that all cultures have more or less spontaneously
reiterated-an empirical thin universalism-or those which are immanent
within the practicing culture-a matter of thick morality-is not the possibility for limiting multicultural claims, as Walzer acknowledges may be
necessary, 44 hampered? Reliance on reiterated commitments to provide the
substance of moral universalism seems inadequate to conceptualize such
limits since, in the absence of reiteration, there would be no legitimately
binding norms to which we could appeal. While we will see that vulnerability to some level of agreement or mutual understanding is an aspect of
Habermasian approaches as well, as it is all other postmetaphysical approaches that reject unrestrained power politics, in Walzer's interpretive approach there is no consistent commitment to a procedure that might provide
the possibility of transforming existing understandings through argumentation and the confrontation of views as there is in Habermasian theory.
Perhaps most damagingly, an attempt to articulate human rights on
the basis of shared understandings and reiteration seems incapable of distinguishing between "truly shared" commitments or genuine universalism and
the imposition of rights standards or particular conceptions of rights on either resisting or simply vulnerable actors and groups within a culture and
across cultures. Similarly, the claim that those human rights are legitimate
that have achieved "historical essentiality" 45 worldwide neglects to inquire
into the conditions under and processes by which rights have developed,
thereby threatening to confuse a "genuine" empirical universalism with a
"false" one. Thus, while consistently maintaining an interpretive rejection
of proceduralism, such approaches cannot distinguish adequately between
human rights standards that have been imposed as a "globalized Western
localism" and those, as Walzer would like to understand reiteration, that are
extended as acts of "mutual recognition." Yet the entire history of human
rights development is littered with impositions, at the level of the regulatory
deployment of human rights in order to justify armed or otherwise coercive
intervention by hegemonic nation-states, at the level of the recognition and
43

FORST, supra note 22,

44

THICK AND THIN,

at 145. See also WARNKE supra note 29, at 30.
supra note 26, at x.

PAULINE JOHNSON, FEMINISM As RADICAL HUMANISM 11 (1994). The incoherence of the idea of "historically acquired essentiality" appears later in Johnson's
argument. She claims that certain rights have acquired an historical universality
45

"forthose who recognize them" but this qualification both seems to undermine the
claim of universality and evades the question of how to identify who has "recognized" them. Id. at 130 (emphasis added).
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construction of human rights documents and declarations and at the level of
their interpretation.
This difficulty can be illustrated further by considering Walzer's
discussion of gender and cultural practices in On Toleration. Describing
the transformation from a "virtually universal male domination" that posed
strict limits to political discourse over issues involving gender roles and
family arrangements, he maintains that "[t]oday, widely accepted ideas
about equality and human rights call those limits into question. '46 But of
course Walzer provides no justification for those human rights-indeed, he
cannot do so given his theoretical position. So we cannot determine
whether they are impositions of unequal power or acts of mutual recognition. Yet the arbitrariness of his position becomes evident when, discussing
female circumcision in immigrant communities in France, he confidently
proclaims "toleration surely should not extend to ritual mutilation. '47 However, as protracted and divisive debates over these practices reveal, 48 this is
a matter of considerable complexity and contestation and Walzer's "culturally intolerant" position is neither sufficiently grounded in a normative
analysis-because it is based simply on conventional or social acceptance
of the relevant rights and the hegemonic objections to these practices-nor
in a respect for other cultural practices that surely require at least a "hearing" rather than dismissal on the basis of a merely, on this account, conventional norm. In recent work, Walzer has sought to answer some of his
critics' charges, but in so doing his approach seems to be inflected increasingly toward a procedural position, in fact, not unlike Habermas' s, while he
still explicitly rejects the validity of such an approach. Walzer's replies to
his critics, therefore, seem to provide further evidence of the untenability of
a strictly interpretive approach. For example, Walzer has clarified that for
46

WALZER,

47

Id. at 63.

supra note 38, at 60.

See, e.g., Isabelle Gunning, Arrogant Perception, World Travelling and MulticulturalFeminism: The Case of Female Genital Surgeries, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTs.
L. REV. 189 (1991-92); Stanlie M. James, Shades of Othering: Reflections on Female Circumcision/GenitalMutilation, 23 SIGNS 1031 (1998); Hope Lewis, Between Irua and 'Female Genital Mutilation': Feminist Human Rights Discourse
and the Cultural Divide, 8 HARVARD HUM. RTS. J. 1(1995); L. Amede Obiora, The
Little Foxes that Spoil the Vine: Revisiting the Feminist Critique of Female Circumcision, 9 CANADIAN J. OF WOMEN & THE LAW 46 (1997); Yael Tamir, Hands
Off Clitoridectomy: What Our Revulsion Reveals about Ourselves, XXI BOSTON
REV. (1996) available at: http://bostonreview.mit.edu/BR21.3/Tamir.html;
Bronwyn Winter, Women, the Law, and CulturalRelativism in France:The Case of
Excision, 19 SIGNS 939 (1994).
48
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"shared understandings" to be considered genuine they "must meet certain
criteria-nonsubstantive but not merely formal. They must actually be
shared across a society. . .and the sharing cannot be the result of radical
coercion." Yet, he insists that such understandings need not "be worked out
in anything like the Habermasian ideal speech situation. All that it requires
is that the extorted agreement of slaves to their slavery, to take another easy
example, should not count ....

We must look for real agreements ....We

reach such a view at the end of a complex historical process." 49 More recently, in the face of controversies over multiculturalism, he suggests that,
in contrast to responses that counsel the re-hegemonizing of high culture in
order to stabilize (read re-homogenize) the society, "there is a better response to pluralism, it seems to me: democratic politics itself, where all the
members of all the groups are (in principle) equal citizens who have not
only to argue with one another but also, somehow, to come to an agreement.'' 50 How can this agenda be advanced? Walzer suggests we need to
"sustain and enhance associational ties including trade unions, family ties,
and cultural associations which are crucial, he argues, to "democratic learning. '51 But Habermasian Critical Theory which relies on discursive principles of legitimation is also, precisely, oriented toward identifying
systematically distorted communication (Walzer's "extortion" and "radical
coercion"), envisions ongoing conversations in the network of communicative practices (rather than a knock-down argument and agreement in a
mythical ideal speech situation which amounts to "philosophical talk"
rather than "real talk") 52 and emphasizes the importance of public spheres
and civil societies that are composed, crucially, of a variety of "associa53
tional ties" oriented toward the "democratic learning" that Walzer seeks.
supra note 26, at 27.
supra note 38, at 97.
51 Id. at 105.
52 A Critique of PhilosophicalConversation, supra note 41.
53 See Forst for a brilliant articulation of this idea in the context of Walzer's approach to critique. Forst suggests that Walzer's reliance on the idea of "shared
understandings" leads him to a position that differs only in emphasis from
Habermas. When one asks "what is the criterion for right and valid criticism?"
Forst claims that even for Walzer it is, "what is generally justifiable to all the
members of a community without the exclusion of some." And he concludes, "as
long as internal criticism can only appeal to those social norms that can be shared,
its vindication can only be general consensus." In a more wide-ranging consideration, we might usefully ask whether this is generally true of interpretive approaches. Forst seems to imply this when he says: "That is the idea of justification
on which 'immanent criticism' rests - an idea of reasonablejustification, of recip49
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Walzer's interpretive approach actually appears to be moving toward a
more deliberatively procedural one, yet he continues to deny the validity of
such an approach.
While Walzer's position now appears to be in flux, or at least includes a deep tension between an interpretive and a more procedural position, the pitfalls of an interpretive position's apparent inability to
distinguish between imposed and consensual "agreements" to human rights
and the appeal of a more deliberative version of proceduralism becomes
stunningly clear in Richard Rorty's work. In his argument for adopting a
pragmatic position toward extending the legitimacy claim of rights beyond
what he calls "our Eurocentric human rights culture" to others, he explicitly
calls for a "manipulation of the sentiments" of others, a telling of sad and
sentimental tales in order to expand the boundaries of those whom we consider part of "our moral community" and making our "morally superior"
human rights culture "more powerful" and widespread.5 4 The appreciation
that Rorty shows for the political advocacy work that may be undertaken to
persuade others of one's own human rights position and his plea for the
relevance of emotion, sentiment and imagination (what would it be like to
walk in her shoes?) are, I believe, necessary for, but not sufficient to, the
just expansion of human rights culture. Rorty's pragmatism also evinces a
corrosive, albeit famously self-conscious, ethnocentrism. But, such an approach is more than ethnocentric. It is, as well, neo-, rather than post-,
imperial. Here the advocacy mission is conceived as a manipulative persuasion, treated as a one-way street inattentive to lessons that may be
learned from, or critiques that may be launched from, others, requiring no
attention to the claims of other cultures or traditions, and certainly displaying no sense that our own cultural understandings may contain blind spots
and weaknesses. Ultimately, Rorty's position is inattentive to a distinction
between a political project aimed at advocatory persuasion, even by manipulation or imposition, on the one hand, and securing the sorts of conditions
that would be necessary to view the results of persuasive practices legiti55
mate, on the other hand.
rocal and general justification with reasons acceptable to the 'interpretive community' without exception .... we find a concept of reason inherent in critique." Forst,
supra note 22, at 147-148.
54 Rorty, supra note 28, at 117, 124, 128.
55 Note that others, besides the "party of humanity," may rely on a manipulation
of sentiments as well. For example, recounting An-Na'im's work, Santos reports
that absolutist Muslims have attempted to counter reformists by proposing the
Shari'a "as a miraculous cure for all the ills of Muslim societies, but it is in fact a
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When rejecting proceduralism entirely, interpretive positions that
urge the articulation, rather than the justification or political and social legitimation, of human rights thus founder on the shoals of legitimacy. Furthermore, despite their attempt to illuminate the politics of rights, politics is
rendered placid or structural, as in Walzer's case, where shared understandings and reiterations are treated as rather mysterious cultural and political
byproducts, or politics is rendered singularly instrumental, as in Rorty's
analysis, where attention to the desirability of politics as deliberation is ignored in favor of politics as a "manipulation of the sentiments." Such approaches seem incapable of doing what Walzer so ably identifies as central
to pursuing "justice justly." To pursue justice justly, he says, we must show
"a decent respect for the opinions of mankind. Not the opinions of this or
that individual. . .Imean those deeper opinions ....-56 But that "decent
respect for the opinions of mankind" cannot sufficiently be shown by employing monological, interpretive approaches. I wish to suggest that it may,
however, be honored on the basis of a deliberatively conceived procedural
approach to the legitimation of human rights that provides conceptual resources for distinguishing between false and legitimate understandings and
that is rooted in the normative ideal of humankind determining jointly,
freely and equally that such norms are justified via the emergence of intersubjective reasons for supporting rights-as Walzer, himself, avers in his
less interpretive moments.
But there is another prominent approach that attempts to address the
relationship between "the political" and human rights. Agonal positions aligned with Hannah Arendt's work and with postmodernism may be viewed
as an antidote to the ultimately apolitical character of interpretive positions
like Walzer's, while they threaten to exacerbate the legitimacy deficit implicit in approaches like both Walzer's and Rorty' s. Yet, while having little
to say specifically about human rights, 57 they maintain an important political impulse and an attention to power and contestation that needs to be
attended to in any postmetaphysical legitimation of rights.
When agonal positions understand politics as "resistibility, openness, creativity, and incompleteness" 58 they capture one side of the coin.
manipulation of the sentiments to the masses to protect vested interests and justify
supra note 1, at 343.
supra note 26, at 320.
57 Wendy Brown is an important exception here. See WENDY BROWN, STATES OF
INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE MODERNITY (1995).
58 Bonnie Honig, Toward an Agonistic Feminism: HannahArendt and the Politics
of Identity, in FEMINISTS THEORIZE THE POLITICAL 215-235 (Judith Butler & Joan
W. Scott eds. 1992). See also Judith Squires, Liberal Constitutionalism, Identity
highly unjust societies."
56
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We must accept, it seems to me, that incessant questioning and the everpresent possibility of resistance and resistibility are necessary and desirable
aspects of post-traditional societies, national and global. It is through such
practices that human rights get elaborated, placed on political agendas,
questioned, contested and reconceived. It is also how they remain self-reflexive. In this way, the sociological side of rights may be understood. If,
on the other hand, agonal positions reject proceduralism entirely, because
they view procedures, rules, constitutions and the like as "constative" and
necessarily antipolitical, as Judith Squires suggests they do, 9 in fact they do
not take their own agonal inclinations seriously enough.
Such a version of agonism can be found in Wendy Brown's work.60
On this version agonism is equated with a rejection of procedural norms 61
and moral claims or any commitment to normativity. This is made clear
when Brown counsels that "[s]urrendering epistemological foundations
means giving up the ground of specifically moral claims against domination
• . .and moving instead into the domain of the sheerly political: 'wars of

position' and amoral contests about the just. '62 On this understanding,
agonism is both dangerous and inconsistent. It is dangerous for it proposes
no way to conceptualize the means by which to accommodate the diversity
so pressing in contemporary life in a noncoercive manner.63 It appears inconsistent when, like Walzer's later defence of interpretivism, it also often
seeks procedures. For example, just after counseling us to give up moral
claims against domination and engage in 'wars of position', Brown calls for
"the deliberative development of postmoral and antirelativist political
spaces, practices of deliberation, and modes of application."64 But it is only
and Difference, XLIV POL. STUD. 620, 621 (1996); Seyla Benhabib, Introduction:
The Democratic Moment and the Problem of Difference, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 3, 7-9 (Seyla Benhabib,
ed., 1996)[hereinafter DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE].

Thus, according to Squires, Honig "opts for difference at the expense of procedures and rejects constative politics altogether." Squires, supra note 58, at 628.
60 See BROWN, supra note 57. See also Dana R. Villa, Postmodernism and the
Public Sphere, 86 AMER. POL. Sci. R.Ev. 712 (1992).
61
A position that is apparently inconsistent with Arendt, who endorsed the American Declaration of Independence. But see Benhabib, supra note 58, at 8 (for such
an interpretation of the agonistic position of Honig and others).
62 BROWN, supra note 57, at 45.
63- Noel O'Sullivan, Difference and the Concept of the Political in Contemporary
Political Philosophy, XLV POL. STUD. 739, 753 (1997).
64 BROwN, supra note 57, at 48. Chantal Mouffe also seems to adopt an inconsistent and inconclusive position. Mouffe does not reject procedures per se, but her
59
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on an understanding of the "moral" as defined by foundationalism that we
would require postmoral spaces, and "antirelativist" political spaces and deliberative practices clearly make reference to some sort of commitment to
65
proceduralism.
From a discourse-theoretic point of view, constitutions-to take a
key example-are not constative 66 and antipolitical. Nor are rights treated
as self-evident truths, lacking any requirement for "'argumentative demonstration or political persuasion,'1, 67 requiring no element of mutual understanding for their validity. Neither does a deliberative view indicate that the
content of constitutions and rights must be fixed, immune to transformation.
If we understand the core of agonism to mean something like continual
openness to contestation, resistibility and redefinition-a commitment to
transformative possibilities-and understand human rights in
postmetaphysical terms, then there is room, I suggest, for the combination
of such agonal inclinations and deliberative procedural commitments, with
proceduralism supplying a possible answer to the legitimation gap that is
position regarding democratic institutions, human rights and the public spheres is
inconsistent and inconclusive. For example, she conflates Rawls's and Habermas's
versions of rational politics and universalism and, on the basis of a review of
Rawls, concludes that we must reject any form of rationalism and yet she also
claims that we must be able to distinguish between subordinating forms of difference, which must be limited or excluded, and emancipatory forms. But how is this
to be done while avoiding all forms of rationalism? Chantal Mouffe, Democracy,
Power and the 'Political',in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE, 245-256 (1996).
65 See BROWN, supra note 57, at 51 for further confirmation of the inconsistency
in agonal positions. Here, Brown calls for democratic political spaces where "political conversation oriented toward diversity and the common [sic]... offers us the
greatest possibility of countering postmodern social fragmentations and political
disintegrations." Id.
66 Honig relies on the distinction made by Austin between constative and
performative uses of speech. In constative speech, the speaker states something. In
performative speech, she does something. Using this distinction to probe Hannah
Arendt's work, Honig emphasizes the difference in the American Declaration of
Independence between the performative "we hold" and the constative "truths to be
self-evident." Bonnie Honig, Toward an Agonistic Feminism: Hannah Arendt and
the Politics of Identity, in FEMINISM AND THE INTERPRETATION OF HANNAH ARENDT
135, 161 n. 5 (Bonnie Honig ed., 1995).
67 Hannah Arendt quoted in Honig, supra note 58, at 217. In this revealing passage, Honig reviews Arendt's treatment of the American Declaration of Independence. Arendt claims that the Declaration of Independence receives its authority
from the performative "we hold" rather than the "constative" "truths to be selfevident." Id.
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necessarily left open in at least these versions of agonism 61 and agonal commitments to jettisoning moral discourse and any and all commitment to rationality, mutual understanding or procedural justice.
Interpretive and agonal approaches to "the political" often end up,
then, in one of two untenable positions that have negative implications for
human rights. Either they reject proceduralism entirely, in which case there
is no way to evaluate the legitimacy of human rights norms, leaving them
entirely to the play of "amoral power politics," or they are inconsistent in
rejecting proceduralism while also falling back into it. The latter problem is
a serious one less because of its conceptual inconsistency and more because
it can maintain only a casual, radically underdeveloped conception of
proceduralism.
II.

HABERMASIAN CRITICAL THEORY AND THE LEGITIMATION OF RIGHTS

Scholars of human rights have begun to develop more intersubjective and deliberative orientations 69 than that which is sometimes inconsistently and unevenly present in interpretive and agonal approaches.
Abdullahi An-Na'im and de Sousa Santos have been at the forefront of
these developments, but others have also adopted more or less self-conThus combining "juridical settlement" with "the perpetuity of political contest."
O'Sullivan, supra note 63, at 745. My interpretation is consistent with Markell's
interpretation of Habermas's politics as requiring agonistic politics, and Benhabib's
apparent agreement with this. My interpretation also makes sense of a tension in
68

Squires' analysis of agonism. She contends that theorists of agonism necessarily
reject proceduralism, yet she later acknowledges that some agonal theorists, like
Mouffe, in fact attempt to combine the two. See Patchen Markell, Contesting Consensus: RereadingHabermas on the Public Sphere, 3 CONSTELLATIONS 377 (1997);
DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE, supra note 58, at 74; Squires, supra note 58, at 96.
69 There are important differences in "procedural" positions. Rawls's use of the

"original position" is also procedurally oriented, for example. I focus here only on
deliberatively interpreted versions of proceduralism. RAWLS, supra note 32. See
KENNETH

BAYNES, THE

RAWLS, HABERMAS

NORMATIVE

(1992);

SONABLE DEMOCRACY:

BENHABIB,

GROUNDS OF SOCIAL

supra note 18;

JURGEN HABERMAS

CRITICISM:

KANT,

SIMONE CHAMBERS, REA-

AND THE POLITICS

OF DISCOURSE

(1996); BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 22; Jurgen Habermas, Three Normative Models of Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE, supra note 58, at
21-30; JURGEN HABERMAS, Paradigmsof Law, in HABERMAS ON LAW AND DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL EXCHANGES 13-25 (Michel Rosenfeld & Andrew Arato eds., 1998)
[hereinafter Paradigmsof Law]; O'NEILL, supra note 25, for discussions of deliberative proceduralism.
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sciously deliberative positions as well. 70 De Sousa Santos and An-Na'im
begin from the proposition that the dominant discourses of human rights
bear Western marks, in their predominately individualistic and secularist
orientation, in the processes of their constitution or in their regulatory deployment. They maintain that official recognition does not signify internal
or cross-cultural legitimacy and, in fact, the majority of relevant actors had
no input into crucial documents like the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. 71 Deliberatively oriented analyses and conceptions of human
rights-international, regional, national and local-emphasize the importance of intra-cultural and cross-cultural deliberations and contestations premised on political equality and mutual recognition in order to enhance or
secure the openness of, the resistibility to, and the legitimacy of, human
rights. De Sousa Santos, for example, proposes a "diatopical hermeneutics"
that "requires a production of knowledge that must be collective, interactive, intersubjective and networked. '72 Such deliberatively achieved legitimacy is crucial for the practical effectivity of human rights and suggests a
process which may open human rights up to a variety of challenges,
redefinitions and the possibility of legitimating both "old" and new rights
justly.
70 See An-Na'im, supra, note 15. See also SANTOS, supra note

1; Michael C.

Davis, Constitutionalism and Political Culture: The Debate Over Human Rights
and Asian Values, 11 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 109 (1998) [hereinafter Constitutionalism and Political Culture]; Michael C. Davis, The Price of Rights: Constitutionalism and East Asian Economic Development, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 303 (1998)
[hereinafter, The Price of Rights]; Jay Drydyk, Globalization and Human Rights,
47 SOCIALIST ST. BULL. 41 (1997); Gunning, supra note 48; Lewis, supra note 48.
There is, as well, a growing literature in development studies. See Rosalind P. Petchesky, Spiralling Discourses of Reproductive and Sexual Rights: A
Post-BeijingAssessment of InternationalFeminist Politics, in WOMEN TRANSFORMING POLITICS 569-587 (Cathy J. Cohen, Kathleen B. Jones, & Joan Tronto
eds.,1997); Ann Ferguson, Resisting the Veil of Privilege: Building Bridge Identities as an Ethico-Politicsof Global Feminism, 13 HYPATIA 95 (1998). In international ethics, see Alison M. Jaggar, Globalizing Feminist Ethics, 13 HYPATIA 7

(1998); David L. Blaney and Naeem Inayatullah, Prelude to a Conversation of
Cultures in InternationalSociety? Todorov and Nandy on the Possibility of Dialogue, 19 ALTERNATIVES 23 (1994). In social theory see generally, DALLMAYR,
supra note 5; James Tully, Struggles Over Recognition and Distribution, 7 CONSTELLATIONS 469 (2000).
71 SANTOS, supra note 1. For a short history, see JACK DONNELLY, The Social
Constructionof InternationalHuman Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL POLITICs 171-203 (Tim Dunne & Nicholas J. Wheeler eds.,1999).
72 SANTOS, supra note 1, at 345.
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These analyses point in promising directions. But, it is Jurgen
Habermas who has provided the most sophisticated procedural theory of
deliberative democratic legitimacy that may be helpful in refining the pursuit of a deliberative legitimation of human rights, while authors broadly
associated with Habermasian Critical Theory, like James Bohman and Peter
Swan, further develop these insights. 73 These analyses offer a more productive approach to human rights and "the political" than what is available in
interpretive and agonal approaches.
The rejection of, or inconsistent commitment to, procedural norms
in interpretive and agonal approaches to human rights and justice, is addressed in Habermasian approaches to the dilemmas posed by
postmetaphysical, multicultural and globalizing conditions. Habermas
maintains that "the democratic process bears the entire burden of legitimation" as the "only postmetaphysical source of legitimacy. '74 Seizing on the
call for the conceptualization and development of deliberative democratic
spaces that is inconsistently posed by authors like Wendy Brown, and the
call for resistibility to "the consolidations and closures of administrative
and juridical settlement" by Bonnie Honig, 75 Habermasian approaches to
legitimacy offer the promise of opening up human rights discourses to the
sorts of questioning and contestation properly countenanced in agonism,
while providing the deliberatively interpreted procedural ideals by which
legitimacy may be evaluated and possibly secured. They seem, in other
words, to have the resources to be both sociologically aware of the facts of
the contestatory side of rights as well as the normative and practical need
for political and social legitimation rather than success by mere power politics or a manipulation of sentiments. Such an orientation may offer substantial promise under conditions of multiculturalism and globalization because
of its commitment to legitimation by open, inclusive intra- and cross-cultural deliberation.
James Bohman, The Globalization of the Public Sphere: Cosmopolitan Publicity and the Problem of Cultural Pluralism, 24 PHIL. AND SOC. CRITICISM 199

73

(1998); James Bohman, The Moral Costs of PoliticalPluralism:The Dilemmas of
Difference and Equality in Arendt's 'Reflections on Little Rock', in HANNAH ARENDT: TWENTY YEARS LATER 53-80 (Larry May & Jerome Kohn eds., 1997) [hereinafter, The Moral Costs of PoliticalPluralism]; PETER D. SWAN, Environmental
Justice and Minority EcologicalRights, in Do WE NEED MINORITY RIGHTS? 179213 ( J. Raikka ed. 1996).
74 BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 22, at 450, 448.
75
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Habermas's analysis of human rights is two-tiered. First, he attempts to produce a "discourse theoretical justification of basic rights."
Second, he develops a deliberative conception of the interpretation, expansion, contestation and legitimation of human rights. As articulated in his
moral theory and developed in his political and legal theory, Habermas's
discourse-theoretic view of legitimacy is premised on an intersubjective,
communicative conception of reason that emphasizes that the achievement
of deliberative conditions is the key to political legitimacy and normative
rightness. 76 He seeks to locate the justification of norms, including rights,
in a postmetaphysical way that falls neither into liberal natural rights theory
nor into civic republican, communitarian, conventionalist, or "articulationist" accounts. Ultimately, the thrust of Habermas's discourse-theoretic approach to legitimacy indicates that the determination and legitimation of
human rights standards must rest on public justification and deliberation,
aimed at producing mutual understanding, under procedural conditions of
freedom, political equality and publicity, 77 free of coercion, thus permitting
argumentation based on the "exchange of information and reasons among
parties who introduce and critically test proposals. ,78 Elaborating the requirements of discourse ethics and rendering them appropriate for political
opinion-formation and decision-making, Habermas suggests that the key to
a proceduralist understanding of law is that legal orders and human rights
owe their legitimacy to "undistorted forms of public communication" 79 as
found in the "presuppositions and procedural conditions of democratic
opinion- and will-formation." 80
In his discourse theoretic approach to the justification and legitimation of rights in Between Facts and Norms Habermas relies on a self-conscious circularity between these two tiers that, I believe, cannot entirely be
The principle "D"- discourse - stipulates that only those norms "are valid to
which all possibly affected persons could agree as participants in rational discourses." BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 22, at 107.
77 See, e.g., id. at 178-186.
78 Id. at 305.
76

79

Id. at 409.

Id. at 450. Elsewhere, Habermas suggests that legal orders and human rights
owe their legitimacy to "the forms of communication in which civic autonomy
alone can express and prove itself." Note Habermas's distinction between the idea
that law "owes" its legitimacy to civic autonomy, while a legal order "is" legitimate
to the extent that it secures public and private autonomy simultaneously. See Paradigms of Law, supra note 69, at 19. Benhabib similarly suggests that fundamental
laws should be the outcome of "collective deliberation conducted rationally and
fairly among free and equal individuals." Benhabib, supra note 68, at 31.
80

2003

HUMAN RIGHTS & POST-IMPERIALISM

47

avoided. The circularity reveals itself in different ways. A stark description
of it runs as follows: like other norms, human rights must be legitimated
discursively, for the only rationality capable of legitimatory promise under
postmetaphysical conditions is discursive. Yet, the procedural conditions
for the emergence of rational acceptability require something like the core
of the very human rights we seek to legitimate, defend, reinterpret, expand
and so on through deliberation. Habermas conceives of these basic rights
constitutive of democratic practices as "unsaturated placeholders." But
these "unsaturated placeholders" or "legal principles" 81 which lie at the
heart of discursive procedure must themselves be deliberatively interpreted,8 2 or, as Habermas puts it, human rights and popular sovereignty are
"co-original. 8 3 For present purposes, I wish to suggest that this circularity
can not be "explained away" and should not be viewed as undermining the
project of the discursive legitimation of rights. Rather, it is a circularity that
may be self-consciously recognized and constantly held open to question. I
shall return to this point below.
Habermas's work may be viewed as an attempt to fill the legitimacy deficit emergent with the death of natural rights and which is apparent
in interpretive and agonal approaches to human rights. Legitimacy is based
on rationally motivated understanding and agreement that may be produced
in "undeformed public spheres" through actual processes of deliberation
81

BETWEEN

FACTS AND NORMS,

supra note 22, at 126.

For one instance of the circularity, see id. at 453. Various formulations, and in
some cases purported solutions, are offered for this circularity. See Frank I.
Michelman, How Can the People Ever Make the Laws? (A Critique of Deliberative
Democracy), LXXIV THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN 31 (1997); Kenneth Baynes, Deliberative Democracy and the Regress Problem: Response to Michelman, LXXIV
TiE MODERN SCHOOLMAN; BENHABIB, supra note 18, at 30ff. Michelman puts it
as follows: Habermas remains in some respects "a true blue deontological liberal
when it comes to the question of political rightness. Nevertheless, his thought which I take to be representative in this respect of blue thought - makes political
rightness dependent from the start, or dependent all the way down, on validation
supposed to be obtainable only through the constant availability of broadly participatory, actual democratic political processes to take up any question whatever of
fundamental law." Michelman, at 323-324. It is Michelman's opinion that this
problem of "infinite regress" may "immobilize" deliberative democratic theory. See
id. at 316. Benhabib also recognizes the tension within the discourse-theoretic approach. But, viewing this as a hermeneutic, rather than a vicious, circle she is convinced it affects "all reasoning about morals and politics", not just deliberative
ones. Benhabib, supra note 18, at 78. Baynes suggests that "institutionalization" is
the solution to the "problem of regress," See Baynes, at 333.
82

83

BETWEEN FACTS

AND NORMS,

supra note 22, at 122.
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and contestation. In this conception of deliberative democracy, civil society, autonomous public spheres and the expansion of the political equality
of those affected are of critical importance such that the public sphere is
conceived not as the mere "back room" of democratic politics, but rather as
the "impulse-generating periphery that surrounds the political center: in cultivating normative reasons, it affects all parts of the political system without
intending to conquer it." In keeping with this, Habermas emphasizes both
public and private autonomy maintaining that rights "cannot even be adequately formulated, let alone politically implemented, if those affected have
not first engaged in public discussions ... and then mobilized communicative power for the consideration of their newly interpreted needs. '84 One
more passage from Habermas will help clarify the groundwork that is laid
within a discourse-theoretical approach for a politics of rights, and illuminate the importance attributed to deliberation for the formulation and transformation of conceptions of normative rightness. Habermas argues that
intellectuals and spokespersons for social movements may be certain they
have not prejudged anything or treated anyone
as inferior only if all those affected have an effective opportunity to voice their demands for rights on the basis of con-

crete experiences of violated integrity. . . . The concrete
relations of recognition, mirrored in the mutual attribution
of rights, always emerges from a 'struggle for recognition';
this struggle is motivated by the suffering incurred
by... disrespect.85
He finishes this thought with: "This contest over the interpretation of needs
cannot be delegated to judges and officials, nor even to political legislators. ' '86 Rather than monological declaration by experts, or by interpreters
of philosophic or political sorts, according to the discourse-theoretic position we must find answers to our substantive problems-moral, ethical and
legal-under our own steam, premised on the procedural conditions implied
by a discursive theory of legitimacy.
84

Id. at 442, 450.

85

Paradigmsof Law, supra note 69, at 25 (emphasis added).

86

Id. at 25. See also

NANCY FRASER,

UNRULY PRACTICES:

AND GENDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL

DISCOURSE
THEORY (1989). Note that this sort of
POWER,

commitment to inclusion is not viewed by Habermas as contradicting his "structuralist" rendering of communicative power. See, e.g., BETWEEN FACTS AND
NORMS, supra note 22, at 480, where he criticizes the "anti-institutionalist" thrust
of anarchism with its model of "face to face interactions [which] were supposed to
coalesce into an intersubjective practices of deliberation. .. ".
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The conception of proceduralism at work in Habermas's procedural
theory of democracy is complex and multilayered, 87 but what may be most
relevant for the problem of legitimating rights under conditions of multiculturalism and globalization is his conception of the "two-track" model of
deliberative democracy. Here, there is dual and differentiated attention to
the importance of "undeformed" informal or "weak" public spheres where
public opinion may be formed, as stressed above, and more formal sites of
institutionalized dialogue, the "strong" or "arranged" public spheres, which
must be open to influence from the weak public spheres turning influence
into a "jurisgenerative communicative power. '8 8 Thus does Habermas conceive of informal or weak public spheres as "contexts of discovery" where,
under conditions secured by something like constitutional rights, the social
movements, voluntary organizations, media and the like of civil society can
articulate interests, express needs and identities and challenge or contest
prevailing interpretations. Arranged or strong public spheres, on the other
hand, are characterized as "contexts of justification" which are regulated by
democratic procedures.
By thematizing procedure in terms of "undeformed public spheres"
open to communicative action and the generation of communicative power
with the possibility of the production of democratic public reasons and
opinion or rationally motivated agreement that is constituted in "noncoercive communication, '89 Habermas's approach provides criteria that may
help to distinguish conceptually, between communication oriented toward
Kenneth Baynes usefully analyzes Habermas's complex conception of "procedure" concluding "as Habermas uses the term, it designates the attempt to realize
the rights of public and private autonomy through an institutional design that incorporates various practical discourses. Procedural democracy is thus closer to what
has recently been called a 'public reasons' approach... [in contrast with republican
views]. What is central is not a shared ethos, but institutionalized discourses for the
formation of rational political opinion." Kenneth Baynes, Democracy and the
87

Rechsstaat: Habermas's Faktizitat und Geltung, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION
TO HABERMAS 201, 214-215, (Stephen K. White ed., 1995). See also William
Rehg, Translator'sIntroduction, in BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 22, at
ix-xxxvii, xxix-xxxiv [hereinafter, Translator's Introduction].
88 BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 22, at 304, 147. On the two-track
model see James Bohman, Complexity, Pluralism,and the ConstitutionalState: On

Habermas's Faktizitat und Geltung, 28
89

LAW AND

Soc. REV. 897 (1994).

"Communicative power" is borrowed from Arendt to refer to the sort of power

which "'springs up between men [sic] when they act together, and ... vanishes the
moment they disperse."' This is connected by Habermas to communicative action
such that "jurisgenerative communicative power" must underlie law's legitimacy.
BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 22, at 147.
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mutual understanding and mutual recognition, on the one hand, and instrumental action or mere imposition, on the other hand. 90 This is a distinction
which, as we saw, interpretive approaches are incapable of making, and
agonal approaches appear to reject. Recognizing that the "'quality' of public opinion" is an empirical issue, Habermas argues that from a normative
perspective the procedural criteria that demarcate the features of an open
public sphere
provide[s] a basis for measuring the legitimacy of the influence that public opinion has on the political system. Of
course, actual influence coincides with legitimate influence
just as little as the belief in legitimacy coincides with legitimacy. But conceiving things this way at least opens a perspective from which the relation between actual influence
and the procedurally grounded quality of public opinion

can be empirically investigated. 9 1
By retaining the normative ideal of nondistorted communication and legitimate influence leading potentially to mutual understanding, Habermasian
discourse theory is capable of thematizing and criticizing conditions where
communication is distorted, where public spheres are deformed, and where
supposedly "shared understandings" cannot rationally be called "shared,"
because relations of domination or subordination obtain, or because nothing

90 I say "at the conceptual level" for, as Frank Michelman has pointedly argued,
what empirical conditions are required in order actually to render democratic deliberation "fair and open to all" is left open. Michelman treats this as a debilitating
problem in Habermas's theory. He asks, for example, is fair and open democratic
deliberation advanced by controls on economic equality or not? By affirmative
action or (merely) formal equality of opportunity? By the imposition or not of "hate
speech" restrictions? Michelman, supra note 82, at 326-328. I am unconvinced that
this is a debilitating problem, for these matters seem to be precisely the sorts of
issues about which we may deliberate. See also William Rehg, Against Subordination: Morality, Discourse, and Decision in the Legal Theory of Jurgen Habermas,
in

HABERMAS ON LAW AND DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL EXCHANGES,

257-271, supra

note 69; Translator'sIntroduction, supra note 87. See also Thomas Risse, International Norms and Domestic Change: Arguing and Communicative Behaviour in the
Human Rights Area, 27 POL. & Soc. 529 (1999)(on the relationship between strategic and communicative action).
91 BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 22, at 362, (emphasis added). For
critiques of the concept of the public sphere see, for example, Jodi Dean, Civil
Society: Beyond the Public Sphere, in THE HANDBOOK OF CRITICAL THEORY, supra

note 22, at 220-242; Villa, supra note 60.
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like fair, open and effective access is available to all affected parties. This
is crucial for assessing the legitimacy of human rights.
The normative ideal of open deliberation under "fair" procedural
conditions may foster analyses of the conditions and procedures that have
attended the development of human rights theory, the discourses of human
rights, and the development and interpretation of national constitutions, regional human rights regimes and international human rights norms. It supplies procedural criteria of evaluation that may help us to judge whether or
not human rights regimes have been produced and interpreted under the
conditions implied by the idea of undistorted public spheres and undistorted
communication open to all potentially affected parties. The discourse-theoretic approach then provides a conceptual means by which we may consider
whether dominant conceptions of human rights have indeed been turned
from a local idiom into a "globalized localism" by imposition, as authors
like de Sousa Santos 92 claim, rather than developed through mutual recognition based on genuinely open processes of deliberation. We may consider,
for example, whether national constitutions, acts of unification or international human rights regimes have been generated through the interaction of
public opinion formulated deliberatively in open and accessible public
spheres, whether all affected parties were able to exercise their political
autonomy in a relatively free (uncoerced) and politically equal manner in
order to thematize their needs and concerns, whether deliberatively produced public opinion and information were present and whether argumentation amounted to the generation of communicative power influencing the
institutionalized bodies, political systems or international institutions involved. As Habermas says,
Discourses conducted by representatives can meet the condition of equal participation on the part of all members only
if they remain porous, sensitive, and receptive to the suggestions, issues and contributions, information and arguments that flow in from a discursively structured public
sphere, that is, one that is pluralistic, close to the grass
roots, and relatively undisturbed by the effects of power.93
Or, has it been the case that such actions have taken place under conditions
that James Bohman calls "political poverty"?
Bohman provides an important assessment of the consequences of
"political poverty" that may fruitfully be applied to the dominant human
rights politics that took place after World War II. Defined in opposition to
supra note 1.

92

SANTOS,

93

BETWEEN FACTS

AND

NoRMs, supra note 22, at 182, (emphasis added).
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political equality, which, he suggests, "requires a minimum threshold: that
all must have access to the public world," 94 political poverty is defined as a
form of poverty in the public sphere which is "manifested in the inability of
groups of citizens to avoid being excluded from effective participation."
Such exclusions may take the form of an inability to initiate or influence
public deliberation of relevant matters due to suffering extensive social inequality. Importantly, Bohman maintains that it is often the case that groups
suffering extreme social inequality may not be able to avoid being falsely
included either. Their inclusion is false where, unable successfully to initiate dialogue or produce influential public input,
their silence is turned into tacit consent by the more powerful deliberators who are able to ignore them. In these cases,
powerful groups can make presumptive claims about the
'we' that has deliberated publicly or come to an agreement,
a 'we' that does not pass the test of plurality and publicity
contained in conceptions of political equality.
Such "asymmetrical inclusion" is, moreover, extremely difficult to contest
95
by the very parties who suffer political poverty in the first place.
The patriation in 1982 of the Canadian Constitution with its new
Charter of Rights may, on this account, be considered an example of a
process marked by political poverty. The Constitution has remained controversial since its patriation due primarily to the claim of political exclusion
by the province of Quebec. Quebec refused to endorse the Constitution, the
groundwork for which was paved by the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in the PatriationReference case. 96 In that case, the Liberal Trudeau
government, which strongly supported a Charter, argued that the Federal
94

The Moral Costs of PoliticalPluralism, supra note 73, at 60.

95 Id. at 64. See also Habermas where he indicates that the "structures of a powerridden, oppressed public sphere exclude fruitful and clarifying discussions." BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 22, at 362-363. For further discussion of
Habermas's complex conception of political equality see Baynes, supra note 82;
Jack Knight and James Johnson, What Sort of Equality Does DeliberativeDemocracy Require? in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS,

279-319 (James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997); James Bohman, Deliberative Democracy and Effective Social Freedom: Capabilities, Resources, and Opportunities,in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS 321-

348 (James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997).
96 Reference re Patriationof the Constitution 1 SCR 914 (1984). This is called
the "most important decision" ever rendered by the Supreme Court of Canada by

Peter Russell, one of Canada's foremost constitutional experts. See

PETER

SELL, THE JUDICIARY IN CANADA: THE THIRD BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT

H. Rus(1987).
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Government had the power to request the British Parliament to patriate the
constitution, despite the refusal by several provinces, including Quebec, to
agree to it. The Supreme Court of Canada decided that the government had
the legal power to do so, despite the fact that it was a "constitutional convention" that it obtain the provinces' consent. But, the move this decision
initiated, unilateral patriation of the Constitution despite Quebec's continuing dissent and claim of exclusion, has called into question the political
97
legitimacy of the Canadian Constitution.
The Canadian constitutional debates also reveal an effort at providing the groundwork for addressing political poverty by enhancing the discursive quality of the public sphere understood from a more deliberative
perspective following the failure of the Meech Lake Accord (1989) to
achieve consensus of the ten provincial premiers and federal government.
That process was constituted as "politics as usual" in the sense that it was
"dominated by elite bargaining, trade-offs, and pressure tactics." As Simone
Chambers suggests, the ensuing attempts to gain more widespread acceptance of the Constitution indicate that Canadian political elites learned that
"discourse must be inclusive to be fair and that agreement means more than
getting the ten premiers at one time and one place to sign on the dotted
line." Instead, more discursively oriented politics aimed at developing mutual understanding, including a whole host of mechanisms like public consultations and citizens' forums, were initiated in efforts to "create public
98
spaces for the articulation and exchange of ideas, grievances, and claims.
While the ensuing Charlottetown Agreement was voted down in a Canadawide referendum, it is possible, as Chambers maintains, to interpret this as a
rationally motivated disagreement. 99
A further example of the results of a deliberatively stunted constitutional process comes to light when Habermas criticizes the process by
which the unification of Germany occurred in 1990, lamenting the "manipulative mode and the hurried tempo" of unification which undermined the
Thus, as Chambers says, "Canada is in the position of having a legal constitution the legitimacy of which is not universally accepted." Consensus was crucial in
this case both because the Canadian Constitutional convention required it and because the 1982 Constitution that resulted from the process stipulated consensus "as
the standard of all future structural amendments." Simone Chambers, Discourse
97

and Democratic Practices, in

THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HABERMAS

233,

251 (Stephen K. White ed., 1995).
98 Id. See also O'Neill, supra note 25, at 181-199, on attempts in Northern Ireland to grapple with the legitimacy of its constitutional status.
99 Chambers, supra note 97, at 254.
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possibilities for much-needed deliberations and normative agreement. 10 0
Turning to European citizenship, Habermas further questions whether European citizenship "can even exist at all" since "citizens [there] have no promising opportunities to bring up issues and influence European decisions"
due to the underdevelopment of the European political public spheres, despite institutions like the European Parliament, and the lack of extra-national rights of political participation.10 1
Applying the notion of political poverty to Santos's argument that
international human rights have been imposed by imperialist powers and
politics on cultures, societies and groups who have resisted dominant conceptions of human rights and their subsequent interpretations, we may see
that, by discourse-theoretic understandings of political equality, such impositions would be prima facie illegitimate. If it is true that human rights
standards have been imposed under conditions of political poverty-either
in the form of exclusion or asymmetrical inclusion-rather than having
been developed as instances of mutual recognition, those rights standards
stand as expressions of misrecognition, functioning as regulatory forces demanding redress in the form of serious efforts at gaining deliberative legitimation, rather than as emancipatory ideals produced through civic or
political autonomy. As Habermas himself has recognized, the relationship,
for example, between the so-called "Occident" and "Orient" and between
the so-called "First" and "Third Worlds" "continues to bear the marks of a
denial of recognition."'1 2 Under such conditions, a "nonimperialist process
of reaching understanding with and learning from other cultures" is required. 10 3 It is this general procedural orientation of deliberative legitimation that should orient our analyses of human rights today.
Several matters that are important to the deliberative legitimation
of, and the further development of a deliberative approach to, human rights
may now be addressed. First, we can view the claims of the imposition of
"globalized Western localisms" somewhat differently than they have tended
to be viewed so far in the literature on human rights. Second, we are
brought back to consider the problem of circularity in deliberative justifications of human rights, which now appears in the light of ethnocentrism.

100 Max Pensky, Universalism and the Situated Critic, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HABERMAS, 67-96, supra note 97 at 79.
101 BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 22, at

502-503.

Struggles for Recognition, supra note 6, at 119, (emphasis added). Habermas
further argues: "Eurocentrism and the hegemony of Western culture are in the last
analysis catchwords for a struggle for recognition on the international level." Id.
103 Habermas, Citizenship and National Identity, Appendix Two of BETWEEN
FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 22, at 507.
102
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And, third, we may begin to develop a fuller appreciation of the importance
of experiences of misrecognition for legitimating and possibly reconceptualizing human rights.
A.

Globalized Localisms

A deliberative approach to the legitimation of human rights permits
a reorientation toward the claim marshalled by Santos and others in the
human rights debates that the dominant discourses and practices of human
rights have been imposed on other cultures, societies and actors as "globalized Western localisms."' 10 4 The outstanding question from a discourse-theoretic perspective is whether all viewpoints have been and are afforded
political equality and mutual respect or whether "non Western" or other
views and actors were or are effectively excluded or suffer asymmetrical
inclusion. Therefore, from a discourse perspective, the issue of "Western
imposition" is shifted from a culturally essentialist claim predominantly
about whether the content of human rights norms is "Western" to one about
political equality and mutual recognition in the constitution, interpretation
and application of norms. A discourse-theoretic perspective thus requires
investigation into the conditions of the development and deployment of
such norms. If public spheres have not been discursively structured, that is,
if they have been marked by political poverty and misrecognition, efforts at
deliberative legitimation must be forthcoming.
While a discourse theory of democratic legitimacy emphasizes
these procedural questions, the claim often raised by cultural relativists of
various stripes regarding the "Western content" of human rights norms
should not be ignored. It is not a claim reserved for authoritarian political
10 6
1°5
It
positions-ranging from some Asian elites to the Vatican at Beijing.
is also raised by actors, perhaps especially from "the South," in the international women's movement and feminist development politics, 0 7 as well as
by human rights scholars like Santos. But, even if we view the claim that
human rights have a Western content in the form of elevating "Western"
values of individualism and secularism as contestable or unconvincing, as I
think it is, from a deliberative procedural perspective it is a claim that must
remain open to democratic deliberation. Here, the onus would seem to be
note 1, at 339. See also Santos, supra note 11.
See Constitutionalism and Political Culture, supra note 70; The Price of
Rights, supra note 70. See also Pheng Cheah, Posit(ion)ing Human Rights in the
Current Global Conjuncture, 9 PUB. CULTURE 233 (1997).
106 Doris E. Buss, Robes, Relics and Rights: The Vatican and the Beijing Conference on Women, 7 Soc. AND LEGAL STUn. 339 (1998).
107 See Jaggar, supra note 70; Ferguson, supra note 70; Lewis, supra note 48.
104 SANTOS, supra,
105
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equally on those of us who claim extant human rights norms are not specifically Western in content or meaning to convincingly make our case and on
those who maintain the obverse in open and fair deliberation. As an interlocutor in the human rights debate, but one who would claim no special
status in it, I would wish to maintain, for example, that because even individual rights are rooted in intersubjectivity they are not individualistic, atomistic or "Western" in the way typically cited by their critics. But the
important point is that such arguments must be made in the context of mutual respect and open public spheres of argumentation and contestation.
This procedural orientation permits us to avoid the potentially imperial flip-side of the claim about the so-called Western content of human
rights norms, as well. One argument runs that norms claiming universality,
like human rights, are not "globalized localisms." For example, Seyla
Benhabib suggests that they are simply the consequences of the spread of
modernity with its constituent elements, which, while "first assembled in
the West, is [currently] a world-wide phenomenon."' 10 8 According to this
reading, there is no contest over "whose" norms or "which" understandings
have been instantiated in current conceptions of human rights. But this suggestion runs the risk of confusing the actual development and spread of
"modernity" with its power imbalances, imperialisms, injustices-including
its political poverties and misrecognition-and "globalized localisms" for
something already approximating an international moral community rooted
in the adherence to norms of political equality, reciprocity, mutual respect
and recognition. 10 9 Such an analysis of the spread of modernity would ig108 BENHABIB, supra note

18, at 252.
109 Benhabib critiques Lyotard and Rorty for their cultural relativism, claiming it is
based on "poor man's" sociology [sic], that is, it is naive, treating cultures as hermetically sealed, failing to recognize their integration into a global conversation/

interdependence. To the Rortyian challenge that one cannot overcome ethnocentrism Benhabib replies:
"I think the only honest and sensible response in the face of this
observation is that indeed these norms only make sense against
the background of the hermeneutic horizon of modernity; but also
to point out that modernity, although the most significant elements constituting it were first assembled in the West, is a worldwide process and phenomenon."
Id. Thus does Benhabib seem to conflate the actual development of "modernity"
with its "globalized localisms" for something approaching an international moral
community. This she can only do by ignoring the asymmetrical relations which
have been involved.
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nore the asymmetrical relations of power that have been involved.' 10 But a
deliberatively interpreted procedural orientation that is consistently applied
may help to clarify or thematize those relations and suggest that, even if
human rights are a functionally necessary part of social modernity which
has now spread across the globe, injustices of misrecognition marking their
constitution and interpretation must be addressed, and they must be addressed under deliberative conditions. Habermas acknowledged this when
he recently argued that an interpretation of human rights is needed which
"does justice to the modern world from the viewpoint of other cultures as
well as our own."''
B.

Circularity as Ethnocentrism?

Now the circularity problem, introduced earlier, appears anew, this
time in a possibly more insidious guise. A considerable challenge to a deliberative legitimation of human rights lies in the possible criticism that the
presuppositions and commitments of even such a procedural approach are
themselves ethnocentric and imperialistic. Judith Butler, for example, suggests as much when she maintains that
to assume from the start a procedural or substantive notion
of the universal is of necessity to impose a culturally hegemonic notion on the social field. To herald that notion then
as the philosophical instrument that will negotiate between
conflicts of power is precisely to safeguard and reproduce a
position of hegemonic power by installing it in the
2
metapolitical site of ultimate normativity."
To avoid such consequences and not "foreclose in advance future claims for
inclusion," we would have to leave open the term "universality" to permanent contest and contingency; it must be rendered a "site of permanent political contest." 13 Now we are also back to the agonal critiques of
proceduralism, a fuller response to which can no longer be deferred. The
possible ethnocentrism of even a deliberatively interpreted procedural universalism is a highly complex matter that has fostered a variety of responses
110 See Beck, supra note 9; Dallmay, supra note 5; SANTOS, supra note 1; Falk,
supra note 11.
111 Habermas, supra note 17, at 163.
112 Judith Butler, Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of
'Postmodernism', in FEMINIST CONTENTONS: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXCHANGE 35, 40
(Seyla Benhabib, Judith Butler, Drucilla Cornell & Nancy Fraser eds.).
113 Id. at 41.
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from Habermasian scholars. 114 Leaving a fuller interrogation of these varied and protracted attempts to defend such an approach to universalism as
"truly universal" for another occasion, let me suggest several reasons why it
is not as susceptible to Butler's sort of critique as it might appear at first
glance.
Of course, Habermas proceeds on the argument that the pragmatic
presuppositions of communication are universal and unavoidable," 5 a claim
he seeks to justify on the basis of a conceptual argument about communication and empirical and developmental hypotheses about the significance in
social life of mutual understanding. I wish to treat Habermas's argument as
a hypothesis, much as Habermas does, and briefly outline some support for
the general claim that may be found in the struggles over human rights.
As I argued above in my consideration of interpretive and agonal
approaches to human rights, deliberative proceduralism is more conducive
to recognizing, accommodating and limiting differences than either non- or
anti-procedural approaches, like interpretivism and agonism, or monological procedural approaches, like Rawls's earlier work on the "original position." ' 1 6 Thus, it would seem more inclusive than either a nonprocedural or
an Archimedean approach. Furthermore, Georgia Warnke's argument in
favor of interpreting the basis of a discourse-theoretic view of procedural
universalism as central to the mutual recognition of a wide variety of cultural differences seems apt. Reflecting on the debate between Charles Taylor and Habermas over the politics of difference, Warnke suggests that the
"survival and flourishing of a culture" presupposes its ability to be critically
self-reflective and an ability to communicate its values to the next generation in order to reproduce itself. This process seems to "entail its capacity
to show its worth in relation to the worth of other cultures," and to "enrich
itself with what it takes to be valuable in other cultures." ' 1 7 On this thesis,
the survival or possible flourishing of a culture is dependent on the survival
supra note 18; Richard J. Bernstein, The Retrieval of the
Democractic Ethos, in HABERMAS ON LAW AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 69, 287114

See, e.g.,

305;

BENHABIB,

THOMAS MCCARTHY,

IDEALS AND ILLUSIONS:

ON RECONSTRUCTION AND

DECONSTRUCTION IN CONTEMPORARY CRITICAL THEORY

(1991);

WILLIAM REHG,

(1994).
See Morality and Ethical Life, supra note 22; Justification and Application,
supra note 22; WILLIAM OUTHWAITE, HABERMAS: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION
(1994); O'NEILL, supra note 25.
116 RAWLS, supra note 32.
INSIGHT AND SOLIDARITY: THE DISCOURSE ETHICS OF JURGEN HABERMAS

115

117

Taylor, supra note 6; Struggles for Recognition, supra note 6; Georgia Wamke,

"Communicative Rationality and Cultural Values" in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION
TO HABERMAS, supra note 87, at 139.
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of others against which we may test our own cultural interpretations.
Therefore, the conception of tolerance built into deliberative approaches is a
condition of possibility of both "my" and "your" cultural survival. This
suggests that a variety of cultural orientations have a stake in the "possibility of nonexclusive and nondiscriminatory discussions in which we review
our values against those of others."' 18
Deliberative proceduralism in fact entails desirable normative and
functional attributes from a variety of perspectives. Viewed from the perspective of historically subordinatedcultures, groups and societies, it highlights the obligation on the part of historically dominant cultures, groups
and societies to show respect, at least to the extent of engaging in reflective
and fair dialogue with, and listening to, "the Other." As Habermas shows,
the critique of human rights which suggests that they express a distinctively
Western idea of reason misses the function of human rights which is "set up
to provide every voice with a hearing." The basic rights which inhere in the
notion of deliberative proceduralism provide some of the very standards by
which the "latent violations of its own claims can be discovered and corrected." 19 Thus, following Lutz Wingert, Habermas maintains that "human
rights, which demand the inclusion of the other, function at the same time
as sensors for exclusionary practices exercised in their name."' 120 This sort
of orientation toward difference displays, I believe, what William Connolly
calls an "ethos of critical responsiveness,"' 121 short-circuiting absolutist appeals by, say, "Western" states or human rights organizations to the idea
that human rights are set in stone, above debate, unquestionable or irresistible. In other words, deliberative proceduralism's orientation toward human
rights requires abandoning all dogmatic reliances on absoluteness. On the
basis of a discourse-theoretic understanding of legitimacy, which insists
that legitimacy may only be achieved through intersubjective understanding, the response of absoluteness is illegitimate. Viewed from the perspective of historically dominant cultures, groups and societies, deliberative
proceduralism highlights the obligation of historically subordinate groups,
cultures and societies, as well as challengers to human rights of all stripes,
also to engage in deliberation, and thus short-circuits appeals to an absolutist cultural relativism in its defensive, closed and non-reflexive forms.
Furthermore, the acceptability of at least the general orientation toward such a position to a wide variety of actors is suggested by its incorporation by scholars ranging from Habermas and Benhabib, to Santos, An118 Id. at 140.
119
120

Habermas, supra note 17, at 162-63.
Id. at 163.

121 WILLIAM
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Na'im, Taylor and Parekh, to scholars like Connolly, Nandy, and
Todorov. 122 Blaney and Inayatullah, for example, view both Todorov and
Nandy as suggesting that "an ideal form of othering involves respect for the
other as an equal, making possible conversation or dialogue."'1 23 While
such convergence on the desirability of something like fairly conducted
cross- and intra-cultural deliberations based on mutual respect and recognition is insufficient to prove definitively the superiority of a deliberative,
procedural position to all affected actors, it does go some way toward suggesting its broad-based acceptability. This seems to be especially true since
even many of the critics of proceduralism and universalism call for nonhierarchical, "non-assimilative" 124 or agonal and postimperial dialogue 125 as
do many post-colonial theorists including post-colonial feminists. 126 As
Thomas McCarthy has pointed out, alongside claims of western imposition
and imperialism emerge "traces of cosmopolitan ideas in postcolonial critiques of neoliberal globalization" often premised on the same sort of "universalist moral impulses" as found in human rights discourses. 127 All of this
suggests that the broad terms of deliberative proceduralism may be viewed
as just since they are treated as reasonably acceptable from a wide-variety
of perspectives.
Linked to this wide cross-cultural and "cross-theoretical" support
for something like a deliberative proceduralism is a cognitive orientation in
its favor. It seems that scholars and representatives of many perspectives
and social movements call for a "conversation of cultures" or a form of
122

See Habermas, supra note 17;

BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS,

supra note 22;

Benhabib, supra note 18; SANTOS, supra note 1; Santos, supra note 11; An-Na'im,
supra note 15. See also Charles Taylor, Conditions of an Unforced Consensus on
Human Rights, in THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 124-44 (Joanne R. Bauer & Daniel A. Bell eds.,1999); Bhikhu Parekh, CulturalPluralismand
the Limits of Diversity, 20 ALTERNATIVES 431 (1995). On Nandy and Todorov see,
David L. Blaney and Naeem Inayatullah, supra note 70; DALLMAYR, supra note 5.
123 See Blaney and Inayatullah, supra note 70, at 24.
124 See DALLMYR, supra note 5; Butler, supra note 112; Brown, supra note 57;
CONNOLLY,
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supra note 121.
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(1995).
See SANTOS, supra note 1; Kalapi Roy, Political Encautus in Benevolence: Canada, Contraception and Women Having Babies Abroad (2002) (unpubhlished
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127 See Thomas McCarthy, Two Conceptions of Cosmopolitan Justice, in RECONTIONALISM IN AN AGE OF DIVERSITY
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agonal dialogue because it is viewed as an antidote not just to the denial of
self-determination and the injustice of misrecognition, but also to the cognitive deficits of other forms of opinion-formation and decision-making. Deliberation is widely viewed as an antidote to what Isabelle Gunning has
called the "arrogant perception"' 128 associated with monological approaches
for, by including the voices of those affected, such arrogance or paternalistic imperialism is capable of being challenged. Listening to the voice of all
further encourages critical reflection by all parties and brings contextuality
into universalism. And, as one moves from the more informal "contexts of
discovery" to more "arranged" public spheres which function as "contexts
of justification" regulated by democratic procedures, the requirement of issuing public reasons imposes reflexivity on the formation and expression of
individual and group preferences such that "articulating good reasons in
public forces the individual to think of what would count as a good reason
for all others involved."' 129 This further suggests that a deliberative
proceduralism that is self-reflexive, oriented toward its own fallibility and
constantly on-guard for the exclusions and "remainders" that it may produce offers the promise of fair, non-ethnocentric deliberations.
While a deliberative proceduralism may be generally and reciprocally justifiable as the above suggests, it may not be susceptible to convincing demonstration to be empty or devoid of any content. However, because
it is ethically thin it avoids the sort of vicious or dogmatic circularity about
which scholars like Butler worry. That it is not empty indicates why it is a
critical theory. Deliberative proceduralism does not elevate one form of
life exclusively over others but at the same time, as Benhabib argues, it
inclines against "[w]ays of life and conceptions of the good in which domination, repression, exploitation, disrespect, violence, contempt, silencing,
marginalization, exclusion, irrational authority and hierarchical human relations are advocated.' 130 So long as a deliberative approach remains vigi128
129

Gunning, supra note 48.
Benhabib, supra note 18, at 71-72.

Seyla Benhabib, On Reconciliation and Respect, Justice and the Good Life, 23
PHIL. AND Soc. CRITICISM 97, at 105 (1997). Such an orientation is also present in
130

William Connolly's "post-Nietzschean" position: "cultivating the experience of
contingency in identity does not entail the celebration of any and every identity. It
does not open itself to a politics of racism or genocide, for instance. For identities
that must define what deviates from them as intrinsically evil (or one of its modem
surrogates) in order to establish their own self-certainty are here defined as paradigm instances to counter and contest. They stifle cultivation of care for the ambiguous relations of identity/difference through the way they constitute good and evil."
See WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, IDENTITY/DIFFERENCE 14-15 (1991).
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lantly deliberative and does not slide imperceptibly into a more
monological and substantive orientation toward these issues, by determining monologically, for example, in the absence of deliberation that polygamy or female circumcision are illegitimate, it may offer a critical,
nonauthoritarian theoretical position. Finally, and crucially, it entails openness of the sort the agonal theorists emphasize; they are right that "foundations" must remain contingent and contestable. This is accounted for
precisely in the reflexive dimensions of deliberative proceduralism. But,
deliberative proceduralism is critical in a further respect as well; it relies on
a built-in requirement for open public spheres thus demanding the opening
up of discourses to a wide recognition of voices and violated integrities in
human rights debates.
C. Experiences of misrecognition, struggles for recognition and the
deliberative legitimation of human rights

Habermas's suggestion, quoted above, that human rights are "set up
to provide every voice with a hearing" 131 grasps rights as inclusive and participatory but also may treat the existing canon of human rights prematurely
as sufficiently so. Work like Peter Swan's132 and Richard Falk's133 argue for

enhancing the "expansionary" and "exclusion detecting" logic within basic
rights by extending the analysis to demand more robust procedural rights as
responses to the injuries of misrecognition. The work of these authors is
instructive for it may indicate both the potential and limits of a theory of
deliberative proceduralism for human rights under contemporary
conditions.
Peter Swan employs a broadly Habermasian analysis in order to
justify new "procedural ecological rights" in an argument that displays the
potential democratizing implications of a deliberatively interpreted
proceduralism. He describes environmental risks-contra Ulrich Beck-as
falling disproportionately on the poor and racial minorities who all too often
continue to bear not just the lion's share of ecological risks themselves but
also the injustice of exclusion from decision-making that dramatically affects their lives. Swan describes the political poverty that the disadvantaged face in terms of failures to be consulted, exclusion from participation
and the general subordination of local and non-specialist to expert knowlHabermas, supra note 17, at 162.
132 See Swan, supra note 73. See also Peter Swan, Rights, Civil Society and Dualistic Social Theory, 58 ARSP-BEIHEFr 239-48 (Aleksander Peczenik & Mikael M.
131

Karlsson eds., 1995).
133 See Falk, supra note 11. See also SANTOS, supra note 1; Constitutionalismand
Political Culture, supra note 70.
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edge. 134 Drawing on the work of Rainer Forst, Axel Honneth, and
Habermas, 135 he argues that the felt sense of injustice experienced as misrecognition and disrespect has issued in demands emanating from ecologically-oriented social movements in the informal public spheres for
procedural rights in the more institutionalized "emerging ecological public
sphere." Viewed as extending an "oppositional discourse," Swan argues
that attempts to address such experiences of injustice must be premised on a
"procedural notion of normative justification in which all patently affected
persons are permitted to participate."'' 3 6
Interpreted within a theory of deliberative democracy, new procedural rights may be justified on the basis of their contribution to securing a
deliberatively conceived conception of political equality-that is, one in
which all perspectives have the opportunity to participate in processes of
public deliberation over questions of environmental risk. In the absence of
such rights within institutionalized public spheres, Swan argues that it is
unlikely that disadvantaged groups vulnerable to political decision-making
would have a reasonable expectation of influence. 37 But with such new
procedural rights in place, he suggests that decision-making and political
opinion- and will-formation may be premised on a genuine "confrontation
between views"'138 thus enhancing not just opportunities for participation
but also the cognitive qualities of opinion- and will-formation by insisting
that information be equally available to all and creating the conditions
whereby local knowledge can effectively confront expertise. Swan concludes that expanded participation in public fora like hearings on environmental risks can reinforce forms of deliberative democracy. Such public
spheres may then be viewed as spaces for questioning, contesting and influencing policy and legal decisions on environmental matters of risk, as well
as contributing to the further development of ecological public spheres.
Swan's analysis may be viewed as stretching Habermas's analysis
in an important way. He promotes an especially robust deliberative democratic account of the proceduralization of institutionalized or "arranged"
public spheres thus possibly expanding Habermas's call for "institutional
imagination" and "cautious experimentation" beyond what Habermas may
134

Swan, supra note 73, at 187.

135 See

Forst, supra note 22. See also AXEL

HONNETH, THE STRUGGLE FOR RECOG-

NITION: THE MORAL GRAMMAR OF SOCIAL CONFLICTS
AND NORMS,
136

137
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think appropriate for a "proceduralized sovereignty."' 139 Yet, or perhaps for
this reason, this is an important line of analysis that illustrates the possibilities of a critical Habermasian perspective on rights for it theorizes one way
in which political equality and mutual recognition may be enhanced by the
expansion of rights, political will-formation may be linked more effectively
to the informal public sphere via the communicative generation of power
and such power may have a hope of legitimately influencing political and
administrative systems. Thus, ultimately, such an analysis seems to promise to enrich Habermas's commitment to enhancing democratization by im140
proving the "discursive quality of public debates."'
The interpretation of demands for new procedural rights as emanating from experiences of the injustice of misrecognition may be further applied to interpret demands in international human rights debates over the
quality of human rights as "globalized localisms." If we can say that demands by a variety of social movements and NGO's are demands for addressing the injustices of misrecognition, then proceduralism seems an
especially appropriate response to the claims that are being articulated.
Such demands are made, for example, by feminist movements for the conceptualization of women's rights as human rights,' 4' by post-colonial feminisms for an effective voice in debates over cultural practices that "First
142
World" feminists routinely denounce summarily as human rights abuses
and for reinterpreting heretofore Western-dominated interpretations of reproductive rights and development and population policy. 143 Such demands
are also made in Indigenous peoples's struggles for self-determination. We
may further explore this issue by considering the work of Richard Falk. For
the question remains, even if a deliberatively interpreted proceduralism provides criteria that may help us distinguish between past actions that amount
139 See Swan, supra note

132 (for a defense of going beyond "Habermasian border

skirmishes"). See also Bohman, supra note 83, at 924-925 (for a defense of "dem-

ocratic" rather than "proceduralized" sovereignty); William E. Forbath, Shortcircuit: A Critique of Habermas's Understandingof Law, Politics,and Economic Life,
in HABERMAS ON LAW AND DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL EXCHANGES 272-286, supra
note 69.
140 BETWEEN FACTS

AND NORMS,

supra note 22, at 304.

141 MARGARET E. KECK AND KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS:
ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 184-186 (1998).
142 See Gunning, supra note 48; James, supra note 48; Tamir, supra

note 48;

Lewis, supra note 48; Obiora, supra note 48; Winter, supra note 48. See also

Jaggar, supra note 70.
143 See Spiraling Discourses of Reproductive and Sexual Rights: A Post Beijing
Assessment of InternationalFeminist Politics,supra note 70; Roy, supra note 126.
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to impositions of "globalized localisms" and acts of mutual recognition, and
even if it can provide a fruitful mode of analyzing demands like those for
procedural ecological rights within developed national public spheres, as
analysed by Swan, how might it be used to orient a post-imperial reconceptualization and legitimation of international human rights?
Richard Falk echoes Santos's analysis of human rights as "globalized Western localisms" when he argues that, from the standpoint of cultures or "civilizations" that have felt the sting of the "geo-politics of
exclusion,"
human rights discourse is unavoidably perceived, with varying degrees of justification and opportunism, as tainted
by false universalism and its relations to Western hegemony, one feature of which has been, and continues to be, the
suppression of civilizational identity and difference.144
Indigenous peoples thematized the false universalism of dominant human
rights discourses in the 1980's and 1990's, expressing their sense of exclusion and misrecognition and the consequent failure of existing human rights
satisfactorily to account for their "claims, values, grievances and outlooks."
Falk uses indigenous peoples and their struggles in and around the UN as an
example of how transnational activism has produced "alternate conceptions
of rights. ' 145 Extending this analysis to the case of Islam, he maintains that
false universalism and political poverty, conceptualized in this case as "intercivilizational inequality," may be addressed by means of a collective
right to "civilizational participation." 146 While recognizing that "intracivilizational differences" must also be "democratically negotiated," the
emphasis in Falk's proposal is on promoting inter-civilizational equality at
the international institutional level via collective participatory rights. Falk
maintains that
unless authentic participation in the rights-creation process
occurs, the results are not likely to be genuinely representative and the whole process will be regarded as illegitimate
and alien... participatory rights are integral to the acceptance of a political order as legitimate and to a reliable clari47
fication of grievance, demand and aspiration.

145

False Universalism, supra, note 11, at 9.
Id. at 11.

146

Id. at 9.
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For Falk, authentic participation entails "inter-civilizational representation
in the main authority structures of the world." 148
What might we make of Falk's proposal from a discourse-theoretic
perspective? I suggest that there are two interrelated dimensions of such an
analysis, one which calls into question the emphasis on civilizational representation as a collective right and the other, which becomes more contested
within deliberative democratic theory itself, is the orientation we should
adopt toward addressing democratic deficits by turning to global institutional reform-that is by emphasizing the enhancement of democratic sovereignty globally.
At this point the somewhat ambiguous implications of Habermas's
analysis of proceduralized sovereignty must be noted. Despite his emphasis
on discursively structured public spheres in deliberative democracy, the extent to which Habermas's position points us in the direction of a further
deliberative democratization of arranged public spheres and political systems remains somewhat unclear. James Bohman interprets his two-track
theory of deliberative democracy as a retreat to a less robust version of
deliberative democracy, drawing a too sharp distinction between the institutionalized decision-making bodies of arranged public spheres and informal,
public spheres of opinion-formation. On Bohman's interpretation,
Habermas's recent work allows only for further deliberative democratization of the informal, opinion-formation public spheres. But, Bohman objects that this leads to a virtual abandonment of the "democratic constitution
of power by citizens" since the public is thus provided only the capacity for
opinion-formation rather than any direct democratic power. 149 This may
overstate the limitations of Habermas's current theoretical position, but I
agree that, given Habermas's elliptical comments about the possibilities for
"cautious experimentation" and the like there is room for doubt. Regardless
of one's interpretation of Habermas on this point, it is clear that for
Habermas it is the linkage between informal and formal public spheres, and
then between them and systems (political and economic) that is crucial.
Swan's argument for procedural ecological rights may, as I have argued, be
taken as one way to enhance this linkage and enhance the "democratic constitution of power" within a broadly Habermasian frame. But, the emphasis
on linkage might also be used to call into question an analysis like Falk's
that emphasizes collective participatory rights in key authority structures of
148

Id. at 12.
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Bohman, supra note 88, at 925. See also David Abraham, PersistentFacts and

Compelling Norms: Liberal Capitalism, Democratic Socialism, and the Law, 28
LAW AND

Soc. R. 939 (1994).

2003

HUMAN RIGHTS & POST-IMPERIALISM

67

the international system as a mode of increasing the democratic constitution
of power.
In the absence of a further, considerable development toward genuinely global, genuinely public, public spheres, as well as the development
of discursively structured public spheres at more local levels, where needs,
interests, interpretations and identities may be debated and contested under
conditions of political equality, and in the absence of anything approaching
effective global citizenship rights, emphasizing collective civilizational
rights to participation in "key authority structures" may be problematic for
at least two reasons. First, a "civilizational participatory right" in key authority structures such as Falk proposes threatens to gloss over important
differences and inequalities within cultures. While Falk recognizes that intra-cultural differences exist, and suggests they need to be democratically
negotiated, he subsumes such considerations to the more general goal of
global, intercivilizational participatory rights. Group-differentiated rights
may be justifiable where they support equal rights to co-existence. 150 But,
such rights must respect the private and public autonomy equally of all
those affected. The problem with supporting a collective right of civilizational participation, as Falk does, rests primarily on the failure to deal adequately with the fact that where the interpretation and legitimation of
human rights are at issue, contests over them are often as much intra-cultural or intra-"civilizational" as they are inter-cultural. Struggles by feminists in a variety of "civilizational" contexts over the interpretations and
implementations of women's rights as human rights are indicative of this.
At a very minimum, therefore, a proposal like Falk's would need to specify
how public and private autonomy might be protected in the context of such
global collective rights. In fact, Falk does not address who would be considered a "civilizational representative" or how such representatives might
be selected. But, even if it is NGO' s that he has in mind as such representatives, he neglects to inquire into the processes and procedures by which the
articulation of needs, interests, identities and the like can be generated in
the "contexts of discovery." This failure to consider the character of the
informal public spheres is the second weakness in his proposal. Failure to
raise these sorts of questions threatens, in turn, to leave NGO's at risk of
ineffectiveness for want of open public spheres, for lack of representativeness, or for capitulation to systemic pressures associated with being directly
involved in the "authority structures" of global governance. In each case,
the crucial linkage between informal and formal public spheres may be
compromised. It is unclear, then, whether this sort of proposal would enhance the "discursive quality of public debates" or permit influence to de150 Strugglesfor Recognition, supra note 6.

68

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 10

Guides provided by the PC, who had prepared the rooms for the visit,
showed the task force members around the basement. Some victims of torture at the Nyayo House torture chambers were also present.
Nyayo House was built in 1983 and has 12 torture chambers, six each on
the right and left side. The cells were designed as "strong rooms" with very
poor ventilation. Some of the rooms are painted red.
The victims described their ordeal in the cells and asked the task force
members to seek explanation from the government and the architects as to
the purpose for which the underground chambers were intended.
The task force members heard from former detainees present that people
died in the cells of pneumonia and torture while some would be thrown out
to the street and reported as having committed suicide. Former victims
wanted the country to remember the alarming number of persons who committed suicide from the higher floors of the Nyayo house in the 80s, especially in 1986, and others who just "disappeared".
Kamiti Maximum Security Prison
The task force members visited Kamiti because it is symbolic of the role the
criminal justice system played in repressing citizens. Task force members
were able to visit cells that held former political detainees.
The task force members also wanted to see the hangman's noose but it was
not possible. There has been no hangman since 1987. It was also not possible to see Kimathi's grave. Prison authorities were not sure if Kimathi was
buried in Kamiti.
Silas Gacharia, the director of inspections, gave task force members a history of Kamiti before they were given a tour of the prison and to listen to
two groups of prisoners. The prisoners mainly complained about corruption
and delay in hearing their cases, which had caused them to spend more time
in remand. The task force heard that prisoners often waited for as long as
ten years for their appeals to be heard.
Statistics
No. of submission - 39
In support of a commission - 31
Opposed to a commission - 5
Conditional support - 3
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key demand today in the interest of developing a post-imperial reconceptualization and legitimation of human rights is open to question. From a deliberative democratic perspective, the question we need to pose is: what
procedures and struggles offer the most promise for developing discursive
public spaces and then linking these informal sites and practices of opinionformation in culturally mobilized public spheres with the more formally
institutionalized will-formation bodies? The key question must be: how can
the latter be rendered more "porous" and "sensitive" to public opinion generated in the former? Legitimate opinion formation depends on something
approaching open and discursively structured public spheres. But if the latter are currently rarer than we would wish, what are the conditions for such
developments? On my reading of Habermasian Critical Theory, the crucial
issue now concerns the dual demand of democratization of key authority
structures in global governance along with building the conditions and capacities-global, societal, national, cultural, group and individual-for improving the "discursive quality of public spheres"' 160 and developing the
meaning and practicability of a "right to justification."' 161 Whether this will
permit or require an increase in the democratic constitution of power as
well as the proceduralization of cosmopolitan sovereignty is an open question. But, it is this sort of orientation that may provide an avenue for developing a post-imperial legitimation of human rights capable of enhancing a
democratic rather than an oligarchic and neo-imperial transition to
globalization.
CONCLUSION

Such a conclusion should issue in the call for reinvigorating deliberations, in the face of current struggles for recognition, in order to attempt

to secure the legitimacy of human rights through fair intra- and cross-cultural dialogue. We might best approach a position that pursues "justice
justly"'162 by developing a conception of deliberative democracy that highlights the importance of fighting for spaces and finding mechanisms by
which the voices of the oppressed may enter into deliberation and contesta-

tion with others based on political equality and mutual recognition, rather
than political poverty. This implies the requirement of developing global,
and developing and protecting national, regional and local, public spheres,
supra note 22, at 304.
See Rainer Forst, The Basic Right to Justification: Toward a Constructivist
Conception of Human Rights, 6 CONSTELLATIONS 35 (1999). See also Swan, supra
note 73; Baynes, supra note 87.
162 SPHERES OF JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 320.
160 BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS,
161

2003

HUMAN RIGHTS & POST-IMPERIALISM

71

civil societies and networks163 capable of sustaining the sort of fruitful, mutually recognizing deliberations in which all traditions may recognize their
own blind .spots and be oriented toward learning in order to begin to develop a post-imperial and just conceptualization and legitimation of human
rights. By holding out the normative ideal of open and fair intra- and crosscultural deliberation, based on argumentation and the genuine confrontation
of views, the potential for responding to radical questioning aimed at
human rights discourses understood as "globalized Western localisms" may
be made possible. Such an approach may foster transformative discourses
while seeking to avoid reliance on something like a "manipulation of the
sentiments" 164 or the naturalistic and evolutionary view of the development
of human rights discourses sometimes implied by interpretive positions.
While remaining vulnerable, therefore, to the requirement of some level of
agreement in order for human rights to be viewed as legitimate (as is true of
all other postmetaphysical approaches which reject unrestrained power
politics as the basis for human rights), a discourse-theoretic approach to the
legitimation of human rights holds out an ideal that the force of the better
argument may orient opinion-formation with the possible (but by no means
guaranteed) result of generating both insight or enlarged thinking and solidarity, rather than leaving understandings in tact as interpretive approaches
tend to do. Such a deliberative democratic approach to the formulation and
legitimation of rights seeks to accommodate the current challenges posed
by multicultural claims and globalization by its commitment to a "multivo'165
cal process of opinion-formation.
We must be on guard, however, to give the metaphor of cross-cultural dialogues real substance by emphasizing the necessity of the politics
of struggles for recognition and redistributions of power to motivate and
nourish the emergence of deliberative conditions. The metaphor is important for it gestures to the procedural requirements for mutual recognition
and discursive public spheres and the attitudes of respect, generosity and
reciprocity that are required. But the proliferating metaphors of a "conversation of cultures," of "diatopical hermeneutics" and "cross-cultural exchange" must be brought back down to earth, not taken too literally or too
idealistically, otherwise we run the risk of falling back into either a triumphalist cosmopolitanism or an imperialist version of human rights or
both. This is where deliberative theory may make its most important contribution. The experiences of misrecognition, of economic injustices, and of a
Mustafa Emirbayer and Mimi Sheller, Publics in History, 27
727 (1998).
164 Rorty, supra note 28.
165 BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 22, at 476.
163

THEORY AND

SOC.

72

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 9

renewed imperialism that have developed under conditions of political (and
other) poverty must remain the object of transnational struggles both on the
basis, and over the very terms, of human rights in order to legitimate and
reconceptualize them in a post-imperial direction. A discourse-theoretic approach to the legitimation of rights thus lays the basis for further political
contestation over the meaning of rights-it assumes the "perpetuity of political contest" that agonal theorists, like Bonnie Honig, properly recognize. 166 Understood in this way, human rights must remain reflexive. By
premising the legitimation of human rights on demands for deliberation
under procedurally fair conditions and linking this demand to struggles that
seek to address the political poverties that stand in the way of this goal,
human rights must depend, as Habermas argues, on the "permanent risk of
'167
dissensus to spur on legally institutionalized public discourses.
Here we see the deliberative and contestatory groundwork laid
within discourse-theoretic versions of the legitimation of rights. These are
some of the issues that a deliberative approach to human rights might address with the aim, not just of evaluating the democratic deficits we currently face, but also of contributing to the conditions where human rights,
public spheres and political institutions-local, national, regional and
global-may be opened to the flows of a proceduralized and democratized
popular sovereignty.
A discourse-theoretic approach to the deliberative legitimation of
human rights may help us, then, begin to address one of the most pressing
issues of our time which consists, as Santos puts it, in "transforming the
conceptualization and practice of human rights from a globalized localism
For a similar interpretation, see Patchen Markel who argues that Habermas conceives of democratic politics in public spheres as "an unending process of contestation, conducted with the critical awareness that no actually existing settlement can
constitute a satisfactory embodiment of the regulative idea of agreement." Markell,
supra note 68, at 378-379. For Habermas, then, "agonistic political action is
among the very conditions of the possibility of democratic legitimacy." Id. at 379.
Furthermore,
166

In a post-conventional society in which every settlement ought in
principle to be open to further contestation and in which no issue,
not even the rules of discussion themselves, can be excluded
from the political agenda, it would be a mistake to interpret the
,orientation toward agreement' as a standard that can justify the
exclusion of 'spontaneity, initiation and difference' from a regularized and normalized public sphere.
Id.
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into a cosmopolitan project." 168 A consistently deliberative commitment
holds the promise of producing such a post-imperial legitimation of human
rights required in the conjuncture of globalization, multiculturalism and
postmetaphysical thinking. It begins to address the cultural imperialisms
associated with globalization and some forms of cosmopolitanism. We
must be clear that it is, however, a project that is both inadequate to the
current scene that includes the politics of human rights imperialism and it is
fraught with risks; it means living without guarantees. It is inadequatenecessary but not sufficient-because it does not, of itself, fully address the
"imperial logic of power"'169 or the risks entailed by the emergence of "military human rights policy"'170 such as we see in late modernity. It does, however, offer one element of redress for the cultural aspect of imperialism. It
is risky for, as Beck emphasizes, legitimate rights may entail their own
dangers. But life without guarantees does not mean we must live life with
no normative ideals. And the ideal of the just expansion of human rights
based on cross- and intra-cultural deliberations capable of testing and producing discursively legitimated human rights imagines the replacement of a
cultural imperialism with a post-imperialism. This is a political imaginary
worth struggling over.
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